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In studying the “fresh start” provisions of personal bankruptcy law, econo-
mists typically focus on the forgiveness of debts. However, another impor-
tant feature is the forgetting of past defaults. In many countries, lenders
are not permitted to use information about past defaults after a speciﬁed
period of time has elapsed; for example, in the United States information
about a bankruptcy cannot be reported after 10 years.
In this paper we model this provision and determine conditions under
which it is optimal. We develop a model in which entrepreneurs must re-
peatedly seek external funds to ﬁnance a sequence of risky projects under
conditions of both adverse selection and moral hazard. In this setup, repu-
tation eﬀects encourage agents to exert high eﬀort; however, it is typically
the case that reputation is not eﬃcacious until agents have accumulated a
suﬃciently good credit history to make default unattractive.
We show that in our model forgetting a default makes incentives worse,
ex-ante, because it reduces the punishment from failure. On the other hand,
following a default forgetting may be beneﬁcial, because by improving an
entrepreneur’s reputation, it increases the incentive to exert eﬀort to pre-
serve this reputation. Our key result is that if agents are suﬃciently patient,
and low eﬀort is not too ineﬃcient, then welfare is higher in the presence
of an appropriate amount of forgetting, that is, by limiting the information
used by lenders on borrowers’ credit history. We also argue that forgetting
must be the outcome of a regulatory intervention by the government — no
lender would willingly agree to ignore the information available to him.
The focus of this paper is the eﬀect on investment of laws governing
bankruptcy.1 We thus have in mind a world of small entrepreneurs who
ﬁnance their business ventures with loans for which they are personally
liable. Data from the 1993 National Survey of Small Business Finance
(NSSBF) suggests that the majority of small businesses do indeed ﬁnance
themselves with some sort of personal loan or guarantee; see also Berger
and Udell (1995). These entrepreneurs are also three times as likely to ﬁle
for personal bankruptcy as their counterparts in the general population —
see Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook (1989). In such a setting we are then
naturally led to explore the incentive eﬀects of these laws. This seems to
be where the greatest economic impact should be found, and indeed, incen-
tives featured prominently in the policy debate surrounding the adoption of
1It should also be noted that similar restrictions exist in other contexts, such as motor
vehicle records (Lemaire, 1985) and juvenile delinquency records (Funk, 1996).
2these laws (discussed below). An alternative approach, however, would be to
study the risk-sharing and redistributive impact of these laws on consumers
(see Chatterjee, Corbae and Rios-Rull, 2007).
In the United States, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) prescribes
that a personal bankruptcy ﬁling may be reported by credit bureaus for
up to ten years, after which it must be removed from the records made
available to lenders.2 Similar provisions exist in many other countries — in
the European Union the median time that a bankruptcy can stay on records
is even shorter — only six years (see Jentzsch, 2006 and Miller, 2003 for a
summary of international regulations). And this has also recently become a
topic of renewed interest, as many developing countries seek to set up credit
bureaus of their own (see International Finance Corporation, 2006).
Musto (2004) ﬁnds that these restrictions are binding. He shows that
for those bankrupts who are more creditworthy, access to credit increases
signiﬁcantly when the bankruptcy “ﬂag” is dropped from their credit ﬁle
(after 10 years).3 He also ﬁnds that those individuals who obtain new credit
are subsequently likelier than average to default on this new credit; he in-
terprets this as evidence that these laws are suboptimal. Our model will
be consistent with his ﬁndings, although we will argue that it need not be
evidence of ineﬃciency.
In the Congressionaldebate surrounding the adoption of the FCRA (U.S.
House, 1970 and U.S. Senate, 1969), the following arguments were put for-
ward in favor of forgetting past defaults (or other negative information): (1)
limited computer storage capacity, (2) old information might be less reliable
or salient, and (3) if information was not erased the stigmatized individual
would not obtain a “fresh start”and so would be unable to continue as a pro-
ductive member of society. On the other hand, the arguments raised against
forgetting this information were (1) it forces honest borrowers to subsidize
the dishonest ones, (2) it discourages borrowers from repaying their debts
by reducing the penalty of failure,4 (3) it could lead to a tightening of credit
policies (which would aﬀect the worst risks disproportionately), and ﬁnally,
(4) that it increases the chance of costly fraud or other crimes by making
it harder to identify (and exclude) seriously bad risks.5 We will show that
2Other derogatory information can be reported for a maximum of seven years; see
Hunt (2006) for a discussion of the history and regulation of consumer credit bureaus in
the United States.
3For the less creditworthy bankrupts, dropping the ﬂag has little impact, because they
have many other derogatory indicators in their ﬁle.
4See also Staten (1993), who ties the increase in bankruptcy rates to the increasing
availability of post-bankruptcy credit.
5Some of these arguments have also appeared in the criminology literature, particularly
3our model captures many of these arguments, and will use it to study the
tradeoﬀs between the positive and negative eﬀects of forgetting.
The paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss the relevant
literature. In section II we present the model and the choice problems of the
entrepreneurs and lenders. In the following section the equilibrium notion
considered (Markov Perfect Equilibrium) is deﬁned. Its existence is then
established and properties of the equilibrium strategies are characterized.
The eﬃciency of equilibrium is also discussed. In section IV we study the
eﬀects of the speciﬁcation of the forgetting policy on the properties of the
equilibrium, in particular welfare. We derive conditions under which forget-
ting a default can be socially optimal — and relate them to the empirical
evidence and the policy debate surrounding the adoption of the FCRA. Sec-
tion V provides examples that illustrate these results. Finally, we consider
an extension of the model in section VI. Section VII concludes, and the
proofs are in the Appendix.
Previous Literature
Our basic model is one of reputation and incentives, like those of Dia-
mond (1989), Mailath and Samuelson (2001), and Fishman and Rob (2005).
In these models, principals and agents interact repeatedly under conditions
of both adverse selection and moral hazard. The equilibrium in our model
shares many similarities with the ones in these papers; in particular, agents
build reputations over time, so that strategies are characterized by a period
of low eﬀort followed by one in which risky agents exert high eﬀort. There
are nevertheless some diﬀerences between our model and theirs — in both
the setting (experience goods for Mailath and Samuelson, 2001 and Fish-
man and Rob, 2005, credit markets for Diamond, 1989 and our paper) and
in the structure the structure of markets and information (in our model a
competitive lending sector makes oﬀers to the agents; the oﬀer adopted by
a particular agent is not observed by future lenders).
Our key contribution is to consider the impact of government policies
that regulate the dissemination of information on borrowers’ past history.
Such informationplays a key role in determining borrowers’ reputations, and
hence their incentives. In particular, we use our model to study the eﬀects of
these policies on the dynamics of borrowers’ incentives and lenders’ ﬁnancing
decisions.
The possible beneﬁts for borrowers’ incentives of limiting the informa-
in the case of juvenile delinquency records; see Funk (1996).
4tion available have also been explored by Padilla and Pagano (2000) and
Vercammen (1995) in diﬀerent settings. Padilla and Pagano study the eﬀect
of information sharing by lenders in a two-period model. They show that
while information sharing can improve welfare, it may be optimal to re-
strict the type of information shared. In particular, if information about an
agent’s type is too precise, then a borrower’s eﬀort choice will have no eﬀect
on his reputation; this eliminates the incentive to exert eﬀort. This eﬀect is
also important in our model. Vercammen presents an example in a dynamic
setting that suggests that the optimal policy might involve restricting the
memory of a credit bureau. In his example, however, the beneﬁt comes from
forgetting past successes, since if an agent has experienced many successes
— and so is believed to be good with high probability — then his incentives
to exert eﬀort will be weak, because a failure in the current period will have
little impact on his reputation.6
Another possible beneﬁt of restricting the availability of information on
agents’ past behavior is that it may restrict the punishments a principal
can impose on an agent. This eﬀect has been explored by Cr´ emer (1995),
who shows that using an ineﬃcient monitoring technology can sometimes
improve incentives because by monitoring less eﬃciently a principal ensures
that he will have less information about a default and can thereby commit
to punish more severely (because he will not have enough information to
renegotiate punishments). By contrast, in our model forgetting facilitates
ﬁnancing after failures, thereby making punishments weaker. In a model of
Chapter 11 negotiations, Bernhardt and Nosal (2004) show that it may be
optimal for a court to ignore all information and make liquidation decisions
arbitrarily, since this encourages the parties to reach a better settlement on
their own.
On the other hand, the positive eﬀects that a credit bureau can have
through increasing the information publicly available on borrowers’ histo-
ries has also been widely discussed. One noteworthy paper that focuses
on lenders’ incentives to voluntarily share information is Pagano and Jap-
pelli (1993). More recently, Brown and Zehnder (2006) construct a lab-
oratory experiment in which they show that introducing a credit bureau
into an lending game with anonymous short-term contracts can improve
6In this sense his basic model resembles Holmstrom (1982). We believe, however, that
a model such as ours, in which incentives are worst at the beginning of an agent’s life
(rather than at the end) is better-suited as a description of a consumer credit market.
It is well known, for example that older borrowers, as well as those with longer credit
histories, are less likely to default (see Elul and Subramanian, 2002, and Fair Isaac and
Co., 2003).
5borrowers’ incentives to repay. They also show that this can substitute
for the incentive eﬀects of long-term contracts. de Janvry, McIntosh and
Zadoulet (2006) study the introduction of a credit bureau in a microﬁnance
market in Guatemala. They ﬁrst show that the introduction of a credit
bureau allows lenders to screen borrowers more eﬀectively, thereby reduc-
ing default rates. They identify this as a reduction in adverse selection.
They then split their population of borrowers into two; only half of the bor-
rowers are then actually informed as to the existence and workings of the
bureau. They ﬁnd that these informed borrowers are likelier to repay, i.e.
that awareness of the bureau leads to reduced moral hazard.
II The Model
Consider an economy made up of a continuum (of unit mass) of risk-neutral
entrepreneurs, who live forever and discount the future at the rate β ≤ 1.
In each period t =0 ,1,...an entrepreneur receives a new project, which
requires one unit of ﬁnancing in order to be undertaken. This project yields
either R (success) or 0 (failure). Output is non-storable, so entrepreneurs
must seek external ﬁnancing in each period. In addition, there is limited
liability, so if a project fails in the current period, then the entrepreneur is
not required to make payments out of any future income.
We assume that there are two types of entrepreneurs. There is a set
of measure p0 ∈ (0,1) of riskless agents, whose projects always succeed
(i.e., their return is R with probability one),7 and a set of risky agents,
with measure 1 − p0, for whom the project may fail with some positive
probability. The returns on the risky agents’ projects are independently
and identically distributed among them. The success probability of a risky
agent depends on his eﬀort choice. He may choose to exert high eﬀort (h),
at a cost c(h) ≡ c>0 (in units of the consumption good), in which case the
success probability will be πh ∈ (0,1). Alternatively, he may choose to exert
low eﬀort. Low eﬀort (l) is costless (c(l) = 0), but the success probability
under low eﬀort is only πl ∈ (0,π h).
We assume:
Assumption 1. πhR − 1 >c , πlR<1;
i.e., the project has a positive NPV if high eﬀort is exerted (even when the
cost of exerting high eﬀort is taken into account), while it has a negative
NPV under low eﬀort.
7We discuss the role that this assumption plays in remark 5 below.
6In addition, we require the cost of eﬀort c to be suﬃciently high, which
will imply that entrepreneurs face a nontrivial incentive problem. More
speciﬁcally, as we will see, this condition implies that high eﬀort cannot
be implemented in the absence of reputational incentives (e.g. in a static
framework) when the entrepreneur is known for certain to be risky.
Assumption 2. c
πh−πl >R− 1/πh
Finally, we introduce one further parameter restriction, requiring that
πh and πl not be too far apart. This condition will be used only in some




In addition to entrepreneurs, there are lenders, who provide external
funding to entrepreneurs in the loan market. More speciﬁcally, we assume
that in each period there are N lenders (where N should be thought as
large) who compete among themselves on the terms of the contracts oﬀered
to borrowers with the objective of maximizing expected proﬁts. Each lender
lives only a single period, and is replaced by a new lender in the following
period. Since lenders live only a single period, they cannot write long-term
contracts. This is seems consistent with actual practice in U.S. unsecured
credit markets, where borrowers often switch between lenders.
A contract is then simply described by the interest rate r at which an
entrepreneur is oﬀered one unit of ﬁnancing at the beginning of a period (if
the entrepreneur is not oﬀered ﬁnancing in this period then we set r = ∅). If
the project succeeds, the entrepreneur makes the required interest payment
r to the lender. On the other hand, if the project fails, the entrepreneur is
unable to make any payment and we assume that the debt that was incurred
is forgiven - or discharged. Since borrowers have no funds to repay lenders
other than the proceeds from their project in this period, with no loss of
generality r can be taken to lie in [0,R]∪∅ .
We assume that an entrepreneur’s type, as well as the eﬀort he under-
takes, is his private information. The loan market is hence characterized
both by the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard. Since under
Assumption 1 it is only proﬁtable to lend to a risky agent if he exerts high
eﬀort, this creates an incentive problem: a risky entrepreneur may in fact
prefer to exert low eﬀort even though the total surplus in that case is lower
(indeed negative).
At the same time, in a dynamic framework such as the one we consider,
the history of past ﬁnancing decisions and past outcomes of the projects of
7an agent may convey some information regarding the agent’s type. Since
lenders do not live beyond the current period, we assume that there is a
credit bureau that records this information in every period and makes it
available to future lenders.
Let σi
t denote the credit history of agent i ∈ [0,1] at date t, describing
for each previous period τ<twhether the agent’s project was funded and
if so, whether it succeeded or failed. Hence, denoting by S a success, F a
failure, and ∅ the event where the project is not funded (either because the
agent is not oﬀered ﬁnancing or because he does not accept any oﬀers), σi
t
is given by a sequence of elements out of {S,F,∅} : σi
t ∈ Σt ≡{ S,F,∅}
t.
We show below that only pooling equilibria can exist in this economy;8
that is, lenders are unable to separate borrowers by oﬀering a menu of con-
tracts to entrepreneurs with the same credit history. Note, however, that
they may optimally choose to diﬀerentiate the terms of the contracts oﬀered
on the basis of entrepreneurs’ credit histories. Hence, without loss of gen-
erality we can focus our attention on the case where a lender oﬀers a single
contract r(σt) to borrowers with a given credit history σt. We let C(σt) de-
note the set of contracts oﬀered at date t by the N lenders to entrepreneurs
with credit history σt, and let Ct ≡∪ t,σt∈ΣtC(σt) be the set of contracts
oﬀered by lenders for any possible history up to date t.
We assume that while lenders present at date t know Ct, i.e., the set
of contracts which were oﬀered to borrowers in the past, they do not know
the particular contracts which were chosen by an individual borrower. This
in line with actual practice; while credit bureaus do not report the actual
contracts adopted by individual borrowers, the set of contracts available is
in fact provided by databases such as Comperemediar ￿.
As discussed earlier, the focus of our paper is the eﬀect of restrictions on
the transmission of credit bureau records. We model the forgetting policy in
this economy as follows: when an entrepreneur’s project fails, with proba-
bility q the credit bureau ignores the failure and updates the entrepreneur’s
record as if his project succeeded in that period.9 That is, S now represents
either a success or a failure that is forgotten, and F represents a failure
that has not been forgotten. The parameter q ∈ [0,1] then describes the
forgetting policy in the economy. Note that we take q as being ﬁxed over
time, which is in line with existing laws.
We adopt this representation of forgetting to make the analysis simpler,
8To be precise, we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria, and show that these must be
pooling.
9A similar approach is also taken by Padilla and Pagano (2000).
8though it is somewhat diﬀerent from existing institutions. As discussed
above, in the United States a personal bankruptcy ﬁling may be reported for
up to 10years, after which it mustbe removed from records made availableto
lenders. We intend to argue however that the eﬀects on borrowers’incentives
and access to credit are similar; in particular, that the consequences of
higher values of q are analogous to those of allowing for a shorter period
until negative information is forgotten.10
The timeline of a single period is then as follows. Each entrepreneur
must obtain a loan of 1 unit in the market in order to undertake his project.
Lenders simultaneously post the rate at which they are willing to lend in this
period to an agent with a given credit history, and do this for all possible
credit histories at that date. If an entrepreneur is oﬀered ﬁnancing, and
if he chooses to be ﬁnanced, he undertakes the project (funds lent cannot
be diverted to consumption), and if he is risky he also chooses his eﬀort
level. The outcome of the project is then realized: if the project succeeds
the entrepreneur uses the revenue R of the project to make the required
payment r to the lender, while if the project fails the entrepreneur defaults
and makes no payment (since his default is forgiven). Note that — purely
for convenience — we assume that entrepreneurs repay at the end of the
same period in which they borrow.
The credit history of the entrepreneur is then updated by adding a ∅ to
the sequence if the project was not ﬁnanced and, if it was ﬁnanced, S if the
project succeeded in the period or, with probability q, if it failed, and an F
otherwise. This timeline is illustrated in the following ﬁgure for the case of
high and low eﬀort (when q = 0).
Next period, the same sequence is repeated: for each updated credit
history, lenders choose the contracts they will oﬀer, each entrepreneur then
freely chooses the best contract among the ones he is oﬀered,11 and so on
for every t.
Since the updated credit history may aﬀect the contracts the agent will
get in the future, and hence his future expected utility, and since for a risky
agent such history is, at least partly, aﬀected by his current eﬀort choice,
this will aﬀect the agent’s incentives to choose high versus low eﬀort. In
particular, the agent may care for having a good credit history (i.e., a good
10This is indeed exactly so for the polar cases of q = 0, which implies that a failure is
remembered forever, and q = 1, which is equivalent to forgetting immediately, i.e., not
keeping any record of failures.
11We assume therefore that entrepreneurs are unable to commit to any future choice of
contract.
9Figure 1: Timeline: q =0
reputation), as this might improve his future funding prospects, and this
may strengthen the agent’s incentives with respect to the case of a static
contracting problem. Under assumption 2, as we will show in what follows,
incentives may be suﬃciently poor that we need reputational eﬀects to elicit
high eﬀort (and as a result ﬁnancing cannot take place at all nodes).
To summarize, a lender’s strategy consists in the choice of the contracts
to oﬀer to entrepreneurs at any given date, for any possible credit history.
The strategy of an entrepreneur then describes, in every period and for every
possible credit history, the choice of the contract among the ones he is oﬀered
and, if the entrepreneur is risky, also his choice of eﬀort. To evaluate the
expected proﬁt of a loan oﬀered to an entrepreneur with credit history σt an
important role is played by the lender’s belief, p(σt), that the entrepreneur is
a risky type. At the initial date such belief is given by the prior probability
p0; the belief is then updated over time on the basis of the knowledge of the
credit history σt as well as of the contracts Ct oﬀered up to such date, and
of the entrepreneurs’ borrowing and eﬀort strategies. We will often refer to
p(σt) as an entrepreneur’s credit score.12
12We will sometimes drop the reference to the borrower’s credit history and refer simply
to p.
10III Equilibrium
A Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In what follows we will focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) in which
players’ strategies depend on past events only through credit scores — i.e.,
through the belief p, entertained by lenders, that an entrepreneur with a
given credit history is of the safe type. A key appeal of such equilibria is
not only that players’ strategies are simpler, but also that they resemble
actual practice in consumer credit markets, where many lending decisions
are conditioned on credit scores, most notably the “FICO score” developed
by Fair Isaac and Company. In addition, we will discuss below the diﬀer-
ences between MPE and other equilibria and argue that the latter exhibit
properties of players’ behavior that we consider less plausible.13
We can now describe players’ strategies more formally for the Markov
Perfect Equilibria that we consider. Let rn(p) ∈ [0,R] ∪∅denote the
strategy of lender n, i.e., the contract oﬀered (or, when r = ∅, the fact that
no contract is oﬀered) to entrepreneurs with credit score p; then let C(·)
denote the collection of the strategies of all lenders.
The strategyof an entrepreneur, whatever his type, consistsin the choice,
for every credit score p he may have, and given that he is oﬀered a set of
contracts C0, whether or not to accept any of the loan contracts oﬀered, and
if so, which one to accept. In addition, a risky entrepreneur has to choose
the eﬀort level he exerts. We will allow for mixed strategies with regard to
eﬀort and hence denote the eﬀort level by e ∈ [0,1], where e signiﬁes the
probability with which the entrepreneur exerts high eﬀort.14 Thus e =1
corresponds to a pure strategy of high (h) eﬀort, e = 0 to a pure strategy
of low (l) eﬀort, and e =1 /2 corresponds to mixing between high and
low eﬀort with equal probability. The entrepreneur’s choices are based on
the evaluation of both his immediate payoﬀ, which depends on the level
of the interest rate on the contracts presently oﬀered to him and his eﬀort
choice, as well as on his anticipation of the contracts he will be oﬀered in
the future conditional on the outcome of his project, which in turn depend
on the lenders’ strategies and on how they update their beliefs concerning
the agent’s type in light of the outcome of the current project.
In particular, we will establish the existence and analyze the properties
13Restricting attention to MPE to rule out implausible equilibria is common in the
analysis of reputation games; see Mailath and Samuelson (2001), for example.
14This is the only form of mixed strategies that we allow; we demonstrate below that
mixing only occurs for at most a single period along the equilibrium path.
11of symmetric, sequential MPE, where all agents of a given type (i.e., all
lenders, or all safe entrepreneurs, or all risky entrepreneurs with the same
credit score) optimally choose the same strategies. Let pS(p,C0) specify how
lenders update their beliefs in case of success (or forgotten failure) of the
project of a borrower with credit score p and facing current contracts C0.
Analogously, pF(p,C0) denotes the updated belief in case of a failure (which
is not forgotten) and p∅(p,C0) when the entrepreneur is not ﬁnanced.15 The
updated beliefs will be computed according to Bayes’ rule whenever possi-
ble; when this is not possible they will be required to be consistent in the
Sequential Perfect Equilibrium sense.
Observation 1. Since only risky agents can fail, we must have pF(p,C0)=0
for any p and C0.
Furthermore, when entrepreneurs are not oﬀered any loan, C0 = ∅, and
hence are not ﬁnanced, it is immediate to verify that beliefs remain un-
changed: p∅(p,∅)=p for all p.
We are nowready towritethe formalchoice problem for the entrepreneurs.
Each period they have to choose which loan of the loan contracts they are
oﬀered to accept, if any, and in that case their eﬀort level. Let vr(p,C0)
denote the maximal discounted expected utility that a risky entrepreneur
with credit score p, facing a set of contracts C0, can obtain, given the lenders’
updating rules pS(·),p F(·),p ∅(·) and their strategies C(·), determining future
oﬀers of contracts (to simplify the notation we do not make the dependence
of vr on these terms explicit). Observe that vr(·) is recursively deﬁned as




    
    
(eπh +( 1− e)πl)(R − r) − ec
+β[e(πh +( 1− πh)q)+(1− e)(πl +( 1− πl)q)]vr(pS,C(pS))
+β[(e(1− πh)+(1− e)(1− πl)][1− q]vr(0,C(0)), if r 6= ∅;
βvr(p∅,C(p∅)), if r = ∅.
(1)
Note that in writing this expression we have used the fact that, by ob-
servation 1, pF(·) = 0. Let us denote the solution of problem (1) by
er(p,C0),r r(p,C0), which describes the risky entrepreneur’s strategy as p and
C0 vary.




12Analogously, letting vs(p,C0) be the maximal discounted expected utility




R − r + βvs(pS,C(pS)) if r 6= ∅;
βvs(p∅,C(p∅)), if r = ∅.
(2)
The solution to this problem is denoted by rs(p,C0); once again this describes
the safe entrepreneur’s strategy as p and C0 vary.
Since lenders cannot observe the speciﬁc contract chosen by an individual
borrower in any given period, but only whether or not he was ﬁnanced, and
if so the outcome of his project, we have:
Observation 2. Whenever an entrepreneur accepts ﬁnancing, he will choose
the contract with the lowest interest rate: i.e., for all p,C0 we have rj(p,C0) ∈
min(C0) ∪∅ , for j = s,r.
Next, we determine the expected proﬁts for an arbitrary lender n from a
loan with interest rate r oﬀered to a unit mass of entrepreneurs with credit
score p, given the entrepreneurs’ strategies, rs(·),r r(·), and er(·), and the
contracts C−n oﬀered by the other lenders. If r is strictly lower than any
rate oﬀered by the other lenders, and if both types of entrepreneurs choose
to accept ﬁnancing, the expected proﬁts of n (per unit mass of entrepreneurs
with this score) are (p +( 1− p)πh)r if the risky entrepreneurs exert high
eﬀort and (p+(1−p)πl)r if they exert low eﬀort (and a convex combination
of the two when risky entrepreneurs mix over eﬀort levels). When r is
still lower than any rate oﬀered by the other lenders, but only the safe
entrepreneurs accept ﬁnancing, expected proﬁts are given by the ﬁrst term
of the above expressions, pr, whereas if only the risky entrepreneurs accept,
they are (1−p)πhr or (1−p)πlr depending on the eﬀort strategy of the risky
borrower. In the same situations, if the rate is equal to the lowest one oﬀered
by other lenders, i.e., r = minC−n, the market is equally shared among all
lenders oﬀering the minimal rate and hence the above expressions have to
be divided by the number of lenders oﬀering the minimal rate. Finally, if
lender n oﬀers no loan contract, or a rate above the lowest one oﬀered by
the other lenders (r>minC−n), or if all borrowers reject ﬁnancing, then
expected proﬁts are 0. Thus we have:
13Π(r,p,C−n,r S(·),r r(·),e r(·)) =

        
        
{p +( 1− p)[e(p,C−n ∪ r)πh +( 1− e(p,C−n ∪ r))πl]}r/[1+ #(rn ∈C −n s.t. rn = r)],
if r ≤ min(C−n), and rS(p,C−n ∪ r) 6= ∅, and rr(p,C−n ∪ r) 6= ∅
(1 − p){e(p,C−n ∪ r)πh +( 1− e(p,C−n ∪r))πl}r/[1+ #(rn ∈C −n s.t. rn = r)],
if r ≤ min(C−n) and rs(p,C−n ∪ r)=∅, and rr(p,C−n ∪ r) 6= ∅
pr/[1+ #(rn ∈C −n s.t. rn = r)],
if r ≤ min(C−n),r s(p,C−n ∪ r) 6= ∅, and rr(p,C−n ∪r)=∅
0, if either r>min(C−n), or r = ∅, or rs(p,C−n ∪ r)=∅, and rr(p,C−n ∪ r)=∅.
(3)
Notice that in the above expression (3) for lenders’ proﬁts we used observa-
tion 2 that entrepreneurs never choose a rate above the lowest interest rate
oﬀered in C−n ∪ r.
Since a lender lives only a single period, his objective is simply to choose
r so as to maximize his expected proﬁts given by (3). Given our focus on
symmetric MPE, we can denote the solution simply by r(p).
We are now ready to give a formal deﬁnition of a MPE:
Deﬁnition 1. A symmetric, sequential Markov Perfect Equilibrium is a
collection of strategies (r(·),r s(·),r r(·),e r(·)) and beliefs p(·), such that:
• Lenders maximize proﬁts, given rs(·),r r(·),e r(·): for every p, r = r(p)
maximizes (3), when C−n = r(p);
• Entrepreneurs’ strategies are sequentially rational. That is,
– for all p,C0,( rr(p,C0),e r(p,C0)) solves (1) when C(p)=r(p).
– for all p,C0, rs(p,C0) solves (2) when C(p)=r(p).
• Beliefs are computed via Bayes’ Rule whenever possible and are con-
sistent otherwise.
Observe that along the equilibrium path, strategies and beliefs can be
written solely as functions of the credit score p, i.e., r(p),r r(p),r S(p),C(p)
and {pS(p),p F(p),p ∅(p)}. Similarly,entrepreneurs’ discounted expected util-
ity can be written as vs(p),vr(p).
It will also be useful to have the notation rzp(p,e) to denote the lowest
interest rate consistent with lenders’ expected proﬁts being non-negative on
a loan to entrepreneurs with credit score p, when risky entrepreneurs exert
eﬀort e, and all agents accept ﬁnancing at this rate. That is,
rzp(p,e) ≡
1
p +( 1− p)(eπh +( 1− e)πl)
. (4)
14B Existence and Characterization of Equilibrium
The following proposition establishes that a Markov Perfect Equilibrium
exists, and characterizes its properties. The proof is constructive, and we
show in what follows that the equilibrium we construct is the most eﬃcient
MPE.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1-3, a (symmetric, sequential) Markov
Perfect Equilibrium always exists with the following properties:
i. Entrepreneurs never refuse ﬁnancing and always take the contract with
the lowest interest rate oﬀered to them: rs(p,C0)=rr(p,C0) = min(C0),
whenever C0 6= ∅.
ii. Lenders never oﬀer ﬁnancing to entrepreneurs known to be risky with
probability 1: r(0) = ∅, and so vr(0) = 0.
iii. p∅(p,C0)=p whenever C0 6= ∅. That is, if a borrower refuses ﬁnanc-
ing, which only happens oﬀ-the-equilibrium path, a consistent belief for
lenders is that the probability remains unchanged at p. On the other
hand, lenders’ beliefs after ﬁnancing and success are always updated
via Bayes’ rule as follows:
pS(p,C0)=
p
p +( 1− p)[er(p,C0)(πh +( 1− πh)q)+(1− er(p,C0))(πl +( 1− πl)q)]
,
for all p,C0 6= ∅.
Furthermore, along the equilibrium path, the value functions vr(p) and





- when p ≥ pNF ≡
1−πlR
(1−πl)R, the agent will be ﬁnanced at the rate
r(p)=rzp(p,0), and if risky exerts low eﬀort (er(p)=0 ) .






1−β(πl+(1−πl)q) then there exists 0 <p l ≤
pm ≤ ph < 1 such that:
-i f p ≥ ph then the agent is ﬁnanced at r(p)=rzp(p,1) and if risky
exerts high eﬀort;
15-i fp ∈ [pm,p h), risky agents mix over high and low eﬀort with
probability er(p) > 0, increasing in p, and a loan is oﬀered at the
rate r(p)=rzp(p,er(p));
-i fp ∈ [pl,p m) the entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced at the rate r(p)=
rzp(p,0) and if risky exert low eﬀort;




1−β(πl+(1−πl)q) then there is ﬁnancing at the rate r(p)=
rzp(p,1), for all p>0, and risky agents exert high eﬀort.
When c is high (region a.), then incentives are weak. As a result the risky
entrepreneurs exert low eﬀort whenever they are ﬁnanced. Nevertheless,
ﬁnancing can still obtain as long as p is not too low, since lenders are able to
recoup their losses on lending to the risky agents from the safe entrepreneurs
who are also in the pool of agents who have not yet failed, since the latter
never default. By contrast, when c is low (region c.) then incentives are
strong enough that the risky entrepeneurs exert high eﬀort for all p>0.
This makes ﬁnancing proﬁtable for all p>0. Finally, for intermediate values
of c (region b.), high eﬀort is implemented for high values of p. The reason
is that when there are suﬃciently many safe types in the pool, interest rates
(both current and future) are low, which improves incentives. By contrast,
for low values of p this subsidy from the safe types to the risky will be
insuﬃcient to make high eﬀort incentive compatible; when p is particularly
low this will also imply that ﬁnancing is unproﬁtable for lenders.





1−β(πl+(1−πl)q). Note that the low-eﬀort and
mixing regions may be empty, while the high-eﬀort and no-ﬁnancing regions
must always exist for this case. That is, we must have 0 <p l ≤ pm ≤ ph < 1.
We ﬁrst establish property ii. of Proposition 1, that entrepreneurs who
are known to be risky are never ﬁnanced, and show that this is actually a
general property of Markov equilibria. The basic intuition is that once an
entrepreneur is known to be risky, his continuation utility in a Markov Per-
fect Equilibrium must be the same regardless of the outcome of his project,
which makes it impossible to provide him with incentives to exert high eﬀort.
Lemma 1. Under assumptions 1 and 2, any Markov Perfect Equilibrium
is characterized by no ﬁnancing when p =0 : i.e., r(0) = ∅ and hence
vr(0) = 0.






The proof of this result, and all subsequent ones, can be found in the
Appendix.
Combining the lemma with observation 1 we get:
Corollary 1. If an agent fails and this failure is not forgotten, he can no
longer obtain ﬁnancing in any MPE.
Remark 1. As this corollary makes clear, when an entrepreneur fails in our
set-up he is identiﬁed as risky and in that case can no longer obtain ﬁnancing
(since he would always exert low eﬀort). In practice, although it is indeed
the case that those borrowers with a bankruptcy in their credit record do
ﬁnd it considerably more diﬃcult to obtain credit, both Staten (1993) and
Musto (2004)point out that some post-bankruptcy credit is in fact available.
The assumption that only risky agents can fail obviously simpliﬁes the
analysis. Without this assumption, the posterior following a failure would
be above p = 0 and so could result in continued ﬁnancing. This is discussed
further below, where we provide an example that has this property that
failure can result in continued ﬁnancing; we show that the eﬀect of forgetting
is nevertheless qualitatively similar to that obtained here.
Lemma 1 then implies that all Markov Perfect Equilibria must be a
pooling equilibrium. The reason is that risky entrepreneurs will not be able
17to obtain ﬁnancing if separated. Recall that we referred to this property
earlier, when specifying the equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 2. Any (symmetric, sequential) Markov Perfect Equilibrium must
be a pooling equilibrium.
The rest of the proof of Proposition 1 (in the Appendix) establishes the
remaining properties (i. and iii.) of the MPE, and the speciﬁc characteristics
of the equilibrium we construct for the parameter regions a.,b., and c.
Finally, we establish that the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 1
is also the MPE that maximizes welfare. The welfare criterion we consider
in this paper, given the transferability of agents’ utility implied by risk-
neutrality, is the total surplus generated by entrepreneurs’ projects that are
ﬁnanced, or, equivalently, the sum of the discounted expected utilities of all
agents in the economy, including lenders.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 is the most
eﬃcient MPE.
To prove the result, we ﬁrst show that the construction of the equilibrium
in Proposition 1 guarantees that the equilibrium implements the highest
possible eﬀort at any p. To be able to conclude that the total surplus is
maximized, it remains then to show that any other equilibrium that does
not oﬀer ﬁnancing at a node where ﬁnancing is granted in the MPE we
construct will result in lower level of total surplus.
Remark 2. To properly understand the diﬀerences between the MPE as
deﬁned and other Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game considered, it is
important to observe that the Markov property of players’ strategies only
binds at nodes where the entrepreneur is not ﬁnanced. This is because
when the agent is ﬁnanced the updated belief in case of success will always
be higher than the prior one. Hence p never hits the same value twice, so
that on this path the Markov restriction is not binding. Where it is binding
is at the nodes where the agent is denied ﬁnancing, i.e., when p equals zero
after a failure (or in cases a. and b. of the Proposition, when p0 is suﬃciently
low). There the Markov property prescribes that lenders’ behavior has to
remain the same in the following period as well, since p remains unchanged,
and so on, so that entrepreneurs are always denied ﬁnancing.
By contrast, at non-Markov equilibria, lenders’ strategies may entail ﬁ-
nancing when p ﬁrst hits 0, i.e. after a ﬁrst failure, as well as at any successor
node as long as the agent succeeds, and denial of ﬁnancing after a second
failure and forever after. The threat of exclusion after two failures could
18be enough to induce high eﬀort and hence to make ﬁnancing proﬁtable for
lenders. The fact that these strategies imply that the entrepreneur is treated
diﬀerently at nodes with p = 0 requires some coordination among lenders.
Such an equilibrium thus seems somewhat fragile, being open to the possibil-
ity of breakdowns in coordination, or to renegotiation, which is not the case
for the MPE we consider. Moreover, while such non-Markov equilibria have
some similarities with the MPE with forgetting, in that a risky entrepreneur
who fails may obtain additional periods of ﬁnancing, they only exist for a
limited set of parameter values — when c is low and lies in region c. of
Proposition 1, so that incentives are suﬃciently strong. By contrast, with
forgetting ﬁnancing with high eﬀort obtains also for intermediate values of
c (lying in region b.) This is because forgetting a failure in our setup entails
pooling the risky types with the safe entrepreneurs anew, so that ﬁnancing
is granted at a lower interest rate than if their type had been revealed, and
this improves their incentives (see also Proposition 4 below).
Remark 3. It is also useful to compare the MPE we consider with the equilib-
ria we would obtain with long-term contracts. When entrepreneurs can write
long-term contracts with lenders, the non-negativity condition for lenders’
expected proﬁts need no longer hold period-by-period but only intertempo-
rally. This feature will be used in the design of the contracts which obtain
in equilibrium, so as to minimize the cross-subsidy from safe to risky en-
trepreneurs, by postponing any net revenue from the projects ﬁnanced as
far into the future as possible. This will lead to rather extreme and unreal-
istic contracts, where interest payments are equal to R in the initial periods,
and subsequently zero. The beneﬁt for safe entrepreneurs is that fewer risky
entrepreneurs will survive to share in the future surplus. We conjecture that
such an equilibrium, while preferred by the safe entrepreneurs, will be less
eﬃcient (total surplus will be lower) than that considered in Proposition 1
because of the negative eﬀect that postponing payments has on incentives.
If the Markov property is also relaxed, a separating equilibrium may
obtain, since postponing payments can make the safe entrepreneurs’ contract
suﬃciently unattractive to risky entrepreneurs. This requires that the risky
entrepreneurs be able to obtain some ﬁnancing if separated; as discussed
above, this can only occur in region c.
IV Optimal Forgetting
In this section we derive conditions under which forgetting entrepreneurs’
failures is a socially optimal policy. That is when, in the equilibrium char-
19acterized in Proposition 1, q>0 dominates q = 0. The welfare criterion we
use is again the total surplus.
What are the eﬀects of the forgetting policy on the equilibrium prop-
erties? When we are in regions a. and c. of Proposition 1, q has no eﬀect
on the surplus generated in equilibrium by ﬁnancing to safe entrepreneurs.
This follows because, within each region, the set of nodes for which the safe
agents are ﬁnanced does not depend on q: in region c. there is ﬁnancing for
all p>0, and in region a. there is ﬁnancing for p>p NF, where recall that
pNF does not depend on q. So in these cases the only eﬀect of q is on the
surplus generated by ﬁnancing to risky entrepreneurs.
In this regard, a ﬁrst implication of raising q is that the probability
that a risky entrepreneur will be excluded from ﬁnancing decreases: the
failure of his project implies in fact exclusion only with probability 1 − q.
Recall that under Assumption 1 an extra period of ﬁnancing to a risky
entrepreneur makes a strictly positive contribution to the social surplus,
given by G ≡ πhR − 1 − c>0, when he exerts high eﬀort and a strictly
negative one, B ≡ πlR − 1 < 0, when he exerts low eﬀort.
But the increase in q has another eﬀect which needs to be taken into
account: since exclusion after a project’s failure is less likely, the incentives
to exert high eﬀort will be weaker.
In region a. (in which low eﬀort is always exerted when ﬁnancing takes
place), the weakening of incentives manifests itself in the fact that the lower
bound of this region,
(R−1)(1−βq)
1−β(πl+(1−πl)q), is decreasing in q, so that this region
expands when q is increased. Analogously, the upper bound of parameter
region c. (where high eﬀort is always exerted),
(R−1/πh)(1−βq)
1−β(πl+(1−πl)q), also decreases
in q, so that this region becomes smaller when q is bigger.
Let q(p0) denote the welfare maximizing level of q (which clearly depends
on the proportion p0 of risky types in the population, as the equilibrium
depends on it). From the above discussion the properties of the optimal
forgetting policy when the parameters of the economy are in region a. or c.
of Proposition 1 immediately follow:
Proposition 3. The welfare maximizing forgetting policy respectively for
high and low values of c is as follows:
1. If c
πh−πl ≥ R−1




1−βπl , for any p0 > 0 some degree of forgetting is optimal:
q(p0) > 0.
20Thus in region c., when incentives are strong and high eﬀort is imple-
mented everywhere, some positive level of forgetting is optimal.
We now turn our attention to region b., the intermediate values of c,
where the level of eﬀort varies along the equilibrium path (switching at some
point from low to high). The weakening of incentives due to forgetting now
manifests itself not only in the change of the boundaries of this region, which
again altogether shifts to the left as q increases, but also in the change of the
points in the equilibrium paths where the switch from low to high eﬀorttakes
place. Such switching points are identiﬁed by the levels of ph(q),p m(q), and
pl(q) introduced in Proposition 1, i.e. of lenders’ posterior beliefs at which in
equilibrium risky entrepreneurs, respectively, switch to high eﬀort, to mixing
or start getting ﬁnanced, where their dependence on q is now emphasized.
In what follows we will restrict attention to prior probabilities p0 >p NF,i n
which case there is ﬁnancing in the initial period regardless of the level of
q; this will allow us to ignore any possible eﬀect of q on pl(q).
Since, as we said, an extra period of ﬁnancing with high eﬀort makes a
positive contribution to the social surplus, while one with low eﬀort makes a
negative contribution, an evaluation of the overall welfare eﬀect of increasing
q is now more complicated as we have to determine the expected number of
extra periods of ﬁnancing with low and with high eﬀort. Notice ﬁrst that
when p0 >p h(0) no switching takes place, as high eﬀort is always exerted by
a risky entrepreneur when ﬁnanced. Hence an analogous argument to that
used to prove case 2. of Proposition 3 establishes that the socially optimal
level of q is above 0 in this case.
On the other hand, when p0 ≤ ph(0) raising q above 0 does not neces-
sarily increase welfare: we face in fact a tradeoﬀ between the positive eﬀect,
when high eﬀort is exerted (i.e., when along an equilibrium path p>p h(0)),
of the lower probability of exclusion we have with q>0 and its negative
eﬀect when low eﬀort is exerted (when p<p h(0)). There are two facets to
this negative eﬀect. First, as discussed above, when q>0 a failure results in
exclusion with only probability 1 − q, whereas with probability q the agent
is ﬁnanced again in the future, in which case he may exert low eﬀort again.
In addition, raising q will “slow down the updating”. That is, pS(p) will be
closer to p, and thus a longer string of successes will be required until the
risky entrepreneurs exert high eﬀort. We will show in what follows that the
ﬁrst, positive, eﬀect prevails over the second, negative, one when (i) agents
are suﬃciently patient (β close to 1), (ii) |B| is suﬃciently small relative to
G, and (iii) p0 is suﬃciently close to ph(0), since the positive eﬀect follows
the negative one on the equilibrium path.
In addition, we must also take into account that raising q may increase
21ph(q) as well, since the fact that failures are less costly can weaken incen-
tives.16 When β is close to 1, however, we are able to show that ph(q) does
not grow too much, because the positive eﬀect of raising q on the continua-
tion utility in case of success is larger, thereby mitigating the negative eﬀect
on incentives from the weaker punishment after failure that we have with
q>0.





optimal policy might also exhibit forgetting. More precisely:
1. If p0 >p h(0), welfare is always maximized at q(p0) > 0.






then for β suﬃciently close to 1 we also have q(p0) > 0.
While the condition in case 2. is stated in terms of ph(0), which is an
endogenous variable, it is possible to show that it is not vacuous (this is also
evident from the examples in the next section).17
Remark 4. While the above results demonstrate that it is possible to achieve
an improvement in ex-ante welfare by forgetting past failures, it is useful to
distinguish the impact of forgetting across the two types of entrepreneurs.
It is easy to see that — if forgetting leads to an improvement in social
welfare — the risky entrepreneurs must gain, since the improvement arises
precisely because rather than being excluded from ﬁnancing after failing,
with some probability they are permitted to re-enter the pool of agents who
receive ﬁnancing. By contrast, forgetting generally hurts the safe types,
since it slows down the updating, and the lower is p, the higher the interest
rate paid. The only way in which forgetting might possibly beneﬁt the safe
types is if it were to decrease the high-eﬀort cutoﬀ ph(q), since the interest
rate will be lower when the risky entrepreneurs exert high eﬀort. We will
see that this is not the case for the examples presented in section V below;
so in those cases forgetting, while socially optimal, hurts the safe types.
Remark 5. As we discussed above, the social beneﬁt of forgetting failures
arises from the additional periods of ﬁnancing under high eﬀort which it
permits. In light of this, we can also understand the importance of our
16This, however, may not always be the case, since a higher value of q also increases the
continuation utility upon success.
17In particular, let πl → 1/R, so that B → 0. If we hold c and R ﬁxed, then it is
not hard to show that ph(0) will be bounded away from 0, so that the condition will be
satisﬁed.
22assumption that the risky entrepreneur can fail even when he exerts high
eﬀort, i.e., that πh < 1. When this is not the case and we have πh = 1 (as,
for example, in Diamond, 1989) then high eﬀort ensures success, and there
is no beneﬁt from forgetting a failure, since such failures only result from
low eﬀort.
Discussion — Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications
We now discuss the empirical and policy implications of our results. We
begin with an appraisal of the policy debate surrounding the adoption of
the FCRA in the light of our theoretical ﬁndings. We subsequently dis-
cuss Musto (2004)’s empirical results. Finally, we point out that forgetting
cannot be the outcome of the choice of individual lenders, but only of a
regulatory intervention by the government.
Our model captures many of the key arguments made in that policy
debate, which we summarized in the Introduction. Notice ﬁrst that the
main argument put forward in favor of forgetting — that it allows agents to
obtain a true fresh start and hence to continue being productive members
of society — also applies to our model, where the main positive eﬀect on
welfare of forgetting is that it gives risky entrepreneurs who fail access to
new ﬁnancing, and this increases aggregatesurplus if they exert high eﬀort.18
On the other hand, if they exert low eﬀort, then this additional ﬁnancing
will lead to a decrease in surplus; moreover, forgetting also weakens the
risky entrepreneurs’ incentives, and this may cause an additional decrease
in surplus. These capture two of the arguments that were made against
forgetting — that it increases the chance of costly fraud or other crimes by
making it harder to identify bad risks, and that it hurts incentives. Our
model allows us to identify when the ﬁrst, positive eﬀect is present, and,
furthermore, to analyze the tradeoﬀ between the positive and the negative
eﬀects so as to determine the conditions under which forgetting is socially
optimal.
Another argument that was advanced against forgetting is that it might
lead to a tightening of lending standards. This is also captured by our
model. By making incentives worse, the introduction of forgetting can shift
the equilibrium from region c., for which there is ﬁnancing for all prior beliefs
p0 > 0, to region b., where agents are only ﬁnanced when p0 is suﬃciently
high. Just as suggested in the policy debate, the cohorts who are thus ex-
18In addition, two other arguments were also made in favor of forgetting — that old
information may be less relevant, and limited storage space — which do not have a role
in our model.
23cluded from ﬁnancing by such a policy are precisely those with a higher
percentage of risky types (also see example 3. in the next section). Regard-
ing the remaining argument made against forgetting — that it forces good
agents to subsidize bad ones — observe that in our model forgetting indeed
increases the subsidy from the safe to the risky types, by extending the time
it takes for lenders to learn the type of an entrepreneur. However, this has
no adverse eﬀect on welfare and may actually increase it, as the subsidy
improves the risky entrepreneurs’ incentives while the surplus generated by
the safe agents’ projects is unaﬀected, because only the risky types face an
incentive problem in our model.19
We now turn to the question of whether our results are consistent with
the empirical evidence in Musto (2004), and whether we concur with his
assessment that removing this ﬂag is suboptimal. Recall that Musto (2004)
ﬁnds that those who receive credit after their default is forgotten are likelier
to default in the future and that their credit quality (as measured by their
FICO score) declines over time. These are also implications of our model.
Only the risky entrepreneurs ever default; when they are reinserted into the
pool of entrepreneurs who are ﬁnanced they are always more likely than the
average to default in the future, regardless of the eﬀortthey exert. Moreover,
the average posterior for those agents who have been reinserted into the pool
eventually converges to zero, since in each future period they are at risk of
experiencing a failure that is not forgotten. Nevertheless, Propositions 3
and 4 show that forgetting can still be optimal. The reason is that while
these agents are indeed riskier than average, their projects can still generate
positive surplus when they are pooled anew and hence ﬁnanced, which would
not be the case were they to be separated and excluded from ﬁnancing.
Finally, while we have shown that forgetting past defaults can be welfare
improving, this would never arise in equilibrium as the outcome of the choice
of lenders. As shown in Lemma 1, there cannot exist any Markov Perfect
Equilibrium in which agents who are known to be risky (and hence for
whom the belief is p = 0, i.e. after a failure) obtain ﬁnancing. Thus the
introduction of forgetting can only be the result of a regulatory intervention
by the government on the information disclosure rules of the credit bureau.
19On the other hand, if both types were subject to moral hazard, this eﬀect might lead
to a reduction in social welfare.
24V Examples
In this section we present a few examples to illustrate the results of the
previous sections. Let R =3 ,π h =0 .5, and πl =0 .32. With regard to the
remaining parameters, c,β and p0, we consider some alternative speciﬁca-
tions, which allow us to obtain the diﬀerent types of equilibria described in
Proposition 1. Note that for assumptions 1 and 2 to be satisﬁed, the eﬀort
cost c must lie in the interval (0.18,0.5).
1. First suppose that c =0 .48 and β =0 .75; these values fall into region
a. of Proposition 1, for which at an MPE the risky entrepreneurs exert
low eﬀort whenever ﬁnanced (regardless of q). So from Proposition 3
the optimal level of forgetting is given by q(p0) = 0 for all levels of p0.
The reason is, ﬁrst, that the level of q does not aﬀect the region in
which the agents receive ﬁnancing, which is always p ≥ pNF =0 .0196.
An increase in q merely leads to more rounds of ﬁnancing with low
eﬀort, and thus to a reduction in total surplus. In ﬁgure 3 we plot the
values of the total surplus W(q,p0) as a function of the prior belief p0,
for diﬀerent levels of the forgetting policy q. Observe that surplus is
decreasing in q, and also that W(q,p0) = 0 for p0 <p NF =0 .0196.
Figure 3: Region a.: q(p0)=0
252. Let c =0 .4 and β =0 .975. For these values we are in region b. of
Proposition 1, for which high eﬀort is implemented when p ≥ ph(q).
The threshold ph(0) above which high eﬀort is exerted when q =0
can be computed from equation (9) in the Appendix, which yields:
ph(0) = 0.241.
When p0 >p h(0) = 0.241, from Proposition 4 we know that q(p0) > 0
is optimal, because forgetting failures increases the rounds of ﬁnancing
to risky entrepreneurs and in these new rounds they always exert high
eﬀort. On the other hand, when p0 ∈ [pNF,p h(0)) = [0.0196,0.241)this
may not necessarily be the case, because for p<p h(0) low eﬀort is
exerted. However, for the parameters in this example B/Gsatisﬁes the
conditionstated in 2. ofProposition4 whenever p0 > 0.205. Thus some
degree of forgetting will be optimal for β suﬃciently close to 1; we will
verify that this is indeed the case, for instance, when β =0 .975. The
reason is that for these parameters the increase in surplus G = πhR−
1−c =0 .1 from a project undertaken with high eﬀort is high, relative
to the decrease in surplus B = −0.04 from a project undertaken with
low eﬀort and so, for agents who are suﬃciently patient the additional
periods of high eﬀort provided by forgetting outweigh the cost of the
extra periods of low eﬀort at the start of the game.
For example, consider p0 =0 .206. When q =0 ,w eh a v epS(p,0) =
0.448, and so low eﬀort is exerted for the ﬁrst round of ﬁnancing
along the equilibrium path, and high eﬀort forever after, as long as the
projects succeed. 20 However, when q>0, more rounds of ﬁnancing
with low eﬀort may be needed before risky entrepreneurs begin to
exert high eﬀort, both because the updating is slower and because
ph(q) is higher. For example, with q =0 .735 three periods of ﬁnancing
with low eﬀort followed by success of the project are needed until the
posterior exceeds ph(0.735) = 0.322. We now compare welfare levels
for diﬀerent speciﬁcation of the forgetting policy. In ﬁgure 4 we plot
the value of the total surplus W(q,0.206) as a function of q, when
p0 =0 .206. From this ﬁgure one can see that the optimum obtains at
q(0.206) = 0.77, in which case W(0.77,0.206)= 16.648.
We also plot in ﬁgure 5 the optimal level of the forgetting policy21 as
20The risky entrepreneurs do not use a mixed eﬀort-strategy along the equilibrium path
for any of the values of p0 any q considered in this example.
21We discretize the domains of p0 and q. For each point in the grid we compute ph(q)
and then the welfare W(q,p0). We assign q(p0) to be the value of q that maximizes this
surplus, given p0.
26Figure 4: Region b.: social welfare as a function of q (p0 =0 .206)
we vary the prior probability p0.22
3. Consider next c =0 .26 and β =0 .975. We are now in region c. of
Proposition 1, for which high eﬀort is exerted for all p>0, as long
as q ≤ 0.359 (i.e., as long as q is suﬃciently low that we remain in
region c.), forgetting provides additional opportunities for projects to
be undertaken with high eﬀort, and so is clearly eﬃcient. Hence, as
we can see in ﬁgure 6, we have W(0.359,p)> W(0,p) for all p>0.
For higher values of q we move into region b.; it is then no longer the
case that the risky entrepreneurs exert high eﬀort for all p.23 As long
as p0 >p h(q), however, high eﬀort is still undertaken on all projects
which are ﬁnanced and so raising q continues to improve welfare, as it
increases the rounds of ﬁnancing to risky agents. For example, with
q =0 .975 this is the case for all p0 >p h(0.975) = 0.1139.
By contrast, for very low values of p0 there may be no ﬁnancing when
we raise q. The reason is that there is no feasible interest rate which
22Although the condition in 2. of Proposition 4 is violated for p0 ≤ 0.205, we can
nevertheless still have q(p0) > 0 , since the condition is suﬃcient but not necessary.
23For the values of c and β under consideration we are never in region a., no matter
how high q.
27Figure 5: Region b.: welfare-maximizing value of q
would allow lenders to break even for these values of p0; the lenders
make losses on the risky entrepeneurs because they exert low eﬀort,
and there are too few safe entrepreneurs from which to recoup these
losses. Thus raising q too much can lead to a tightening in lending
standards, as discussed in the previous section. For example, when
q =0 .975, then there is no ﬁnancing for p0 <p l(0.975) = pNF =0 .0196;
clearly for these values of p0 a lower value of q must be optimal.
Finally, for p0 ∈ (pNF,p h(q)] we face the same tradeoﬀ discussed in
example 2. above. A higher q leads to more rounds of ﬁnancing where
both low and high eﬀort are exerted. When p0 is suﬃciently high,
the time spent in the low eﬀort region will be relatively short, and
thus increasing the level q of forgetting above 0.359 may still increase
surplus. As we see in ﬁgure 6, when p0 > 0.066 we have W(0.975,p 0) >
W(0.359,p 0). On the other hand, when p0 is low the cost of additional
rounds of ﬁnancing with low eﬀort dominates, in which case welfare is
higher for lower values of q.
4. Finally, consider β =0 .8, c =0 .48 and a slightly lower value for
πl =0 .3. While these parameters are in region b., as in example 2
above, the contribution G to total surplus of a project undertaken
28Figure 6: Region c.: q(p0) ≥ 0.359 for all p0
with high eﬀort is now much lower and agents are less patient. As a
consequence, the condition stated in 2. of Proposition 4 is now violated
for all p0 <p h(0) = 0.628659, and we ﬁnd that, for p0 suﬃciently low,
welfare is decreasing in q as the cost of a less frequent exclusion in the
low eﬀort region dominates the beneﬁt in the high eﬀort region. This
is illustrated in ﬁgure 7 for the case p0 =0 .2.
VI Extension — Both Types can Fail
We extend the model to allow both projects of risky and safe types to fail,
with some positive probability. In this case an agent who fails can no longer
be identiﬁed for certain as being a risky type and we will show that, as a
consequence, he may be able to obtain additional periods of ﬁnancing even
without forgetting. We present an example where we show that this is indeed
the case; in other respects, the features of the equilibria are similar to the
ones found above and, moreover, we ﬁnd that some amount of forgetting
still increases welfare.
Let π ∈ (πh,1] denote the probability that the project of a safe en-
trepreneur fails. Consider the following parameter values: R =3 ,π h =
29Figure 7: Region b.: condition in Proposition 4 violated (p0 =0 .2)
0.5,π l =0 .32,β=0 .975,c=0 .35. When π = 1 (the projects of safe types
always succeed) these parameters fall in region b. of Proposition 1, where
(for q = 0) high eﬀort is exerted for all p ≥ ph(0) = 0.113, and agents are
ﬁnanced for all p ≥ pNF =0 .0196. The situation is thus analogous to the
one of Example 2 in the previous section; by similar computations we ob-
tain that, when the prior belief is p0 =0 .10, the optimal forgetting policy is
q =0 .80.
Next suppose projects of safe entrepreneurs only succeed with probability
π =0 .99. We ﬁnd that equilibrium strategies exhibit, in most respects, anal-
ogous properties to those in Proposition 1 (i.e. when π = 1). To construct a
Markov Perfect Equilibrium, we must however follow a diﬀerent procedure
which relies on numerical methods. We discretize the domain of p and, for
each pair of candidates values for pl ≥ pNF and ph < 1, we compute the value
function for the risky entrepreneurs, using value function iteration. We then
determine whether these values are indeed associated with an equilibrium
by verifying whether any possible deviation is proﬁtable. For the borrowers,
we must show that high eﬀort is incentive compatible in the region [ph,1),
and that low eﬀort is incentive compatible in [pl,p h). For the lenders, it
suﬃces to show that there are no proﬁtable deviations in the regions where
30low eﬀort is exerted or in that where no ﬁnancing is granted, since deviating
when high eﬀort is exerted cannot be proﬁtable for a lender. In particular,
as in the body of the paper, we must associate a consistent belief with any
deviation, and show that this belief makes the deviation unproﬁtable. For
all the admissible values of ph and pl we found in this way we select then
the lowest ones.
When q = 0 we ﬁnd an MPE where high eﬀort is exerted as long as
p ≥ ph(0) = 0.1065, entrepreneurs are ﬁnanced for p ≥ pl = pNF =0 .0199.
So long as p<0.58, we have pF(p) <p l and so a single failure still results
in exclusion; however, for higher values of p an agent will be able to obtain
ﬁnancing following a failure. Comparing these values with those found for
the case π = 1, we see that the region of prior beliefs for which high eﬀort
is exerted is larger, thus the fact that an entrepreneur gets funded also after
a failure when p is suﬃciently high appears to strengthen the incentives
of risky entrepreneurs to exert high eﬀort. The fact that the failure of a
project does not necessarily lead to exclusion has two eﬀects on incentives.
First, it weakens them when p is high since in that case the punishment for
failure is less harsh. In addition, however, the fact that the agent may be
ﬁnanced following a failure in the future raises his continuation utility upon
success no matter what is the current level of p, which has a positive impact
on incentives. For relatively low values of p, which are the ones where the
threshold ph(0) of the high eﬀort region lies, the latter is the relevant eﬀect.
Along the same lines, we also construct MPE for other, positive values
of q. We then compute the surplus function W(q,p0). In ﬁgure 8 we have
plotted the improvement in total surplus (relative to its level when q =0 )
for various values of q: we see that when p0 =0 .1 total surplus is maximal
when q =0 .80.
An interesting feature of this extension is that forgetting may now also
increase the surplus generated by the projects of safe entrepreneurs who are
ﬁnanced. Recall that, when π = 1 this surplus was either unaﬀected or
decreased by the introduction of forgetting. On the other hand now, since
safe entrepreneurs are also at risk of failing and hence of being excluded,
forgetting may beneﬁt them by increase the likelihood that their projects
will be ﬁnanced in the future.
VII Conclusion
We have analyzed a model in which entrepreneurs must repeatedly seek ex-
ternal funds in the market to ﬁnance a sequence of risky projects under
31Figure 8: Both types can fail: forgetting still optimal
conditions of both adverse selection and moral hazard. We are interested
in determining whether the introduction of some degree of “forgetting”, i.e.
of some restriction on the information available to lenders on a borrower’s
past defaults, may be welfare improving in this economy. Forgetting a de-
fault makes incentives worse, ex-ante, because it reduces the punishment
for failure. However, following a default it is generally good to forget, be-
cause it makes the separation between safer and riskier types more diﬃcult,
and pooling the two types of agents reduces the cost of borrowing for the
riskier ones, which makes exerting high eﬀort to preserve their (undeservedly
good) reputation more attractive. The determination of the optimal level of
forgetting trades oﬀ these eﬀects.
Our key result is that if agents are suﬃciently patient, low eﬀort is not
too ineﬃcient, the cost of high eﬀort is not too high and the fractionof riskier
types in the population is not too large, the introduction of an appropriate
level of forgetting — that is, of some limitation on lenders’s access to the
information on borrowers’ past credit history — is welfare improving. We
also show that the introduction of forgetting must be the outcome of some
regulatory intervention — no lender would willingly agree to forget or to
ignore the information which is available to him.
32As noted in the Introduction, there are some cross-country diﬀerences in
the laws governing the memory of the credit reporting system; in general,
European countries tend to allow defaults to be forgotten more quickly. It
would be interesting to study how such diﬀerences are related to diﬀerences
in the economic environments in such countries, in line with our ﬁndings on
the relation between the optimal level of forgetting and the features of the
underlying economy.
A stark feature of our model is the fact that in equilibrium a borrower’s
default leads to his permanent exclusion from any future loan. This is due to
our assumption that only risky agents can fail. If also the safer agents could
default, exclusion might no longer follow after the ﬁrst failure, although
experiencing suﬃciently many failures would eventually preclude further
ﬁnancing. That case is less tractable. However we conjecture, also on the
basis of the analysis of some examples (see section VI) that the qualitative
nature of our results would not be that diﬀerent — and that under similar
conditions forgetting would continue to be an optimal policy.
VIII Appendix — Proofs
A Lemma 1 — No ﬁnancing when risky
If p = 0, since only risky agents fail, we must have pS(p,C0F(p,C0)=0
whatever C0, i.e., the agent will be known to be risky in the future as well.
Furthermore, under assumption 1, if the agent is known to be the risky
type, he can only be ﬁnanced in a given period if he exerts high eﬀort with
some probability, as otherwise lenders cannot break even. But for high eﬀort
(or mixing) to be incentive compatible, the utility from high eﬀort must be
no less than that from low eﬀort, i.e., if the interest rate r which is oﬀered
must be such that
πh(R − r) − c +( πh +( 1− πh)q)βvr(pS(p))+ (1− πh)(1− q)βvr(pF(p)) ≥
πl(R− r)+(πl +( 1− πl)q)βvr(pS(p))+ (1− πl)(1− q)βvr(pF(p)),
or c
πh − πl
≤ R − r + β(1− q)[vr(pS(p))− vr(pF(p))]. (5)
But since, as argued, when p = 0 we have pS(p)=pF(p) = 0, given the
Markov property of the equilibrium we have vr(pS(p)) = vr(pF(p)), and so
33(5) reduces to the static incentive compatibility constraint:
c ≤ (πh − πl)[R − r]
By assumption 2, this can only be satisﬁed if r<1/πh, in which case lenders
cannot break even. Thus the agent cannot be ﬁnanced in equilibrium if he is
known to be risky. Finally, since this agent is never ﬁnanced, it is immediate
that vr(0) = 0.￿
B Lemma 2 — All MPE are pooling
Suppose this is not the case; consider a candidate separating equilibrium.
Let rs denote the contracts oﬀered to the safe types and rr those oﬀered to
the risky in such an equilibrium. From lemma 1 we know that in a separating
MPE the risky types cannot be ﬁnanced, i.e. we must have rr = ∅ for all
nodes along the equilibrium path, and so they receive vr = 0. Hence for the
risky entrepreneurs not to pretend to be safe, we must have either rs = R
or rs = ∅ in every node. But if rs = ∅ the equilibrium would in fact be
pooling, contrary to the stated claim. We now argue that rs = R cannot
be an equilibrium strategy for lenders, because each lender would have an
incentive to undercut and oﬀer R − ￿.
Consider in particular the second period of the game (i.e. the node fol-
lowing a success in the initial period). In this period a lender can deviate
and oﬀer R − ￿ (for ￿ small) to the safe entrepreneurs (only); such a devia-
tion would clearly be proﬁtable, thus overturning the proposed equilibrium.
Note that this oﬀer can be made to the safe agents alone because the credit
history of a safe agent diﬀers from that of a risky one by virtue of the fact
that only the safe agents are ﬁnanced in the initial period in the proposed
equilibrium.￿
C Proposition 1 — Characterization of the Equilibrium
To complete the proof of Proposition1, we establish the remaining properties
of the MPE, i. and iii., and the speciﬁc features of this equilibrium for the
parameter regions a., b., and c.
We begin by verifying property iii. of Proposition 1. The second part
of Property iii., that lenders’ use Bayes’ Rule to update their beliefs when
an entrepreneur does not refuse ﬁnancing, is an immediate consequence of
the speciﬁcation of the equilibrium strategies. When a borrower refuses
ﬁnancing, however, then Bayes’ Rule cannot be applied. The ﬁrst part of
Property iii. requires us to show that a consistent belief for lenders is to
34keep their beliefs unchanged if an entrepreneur refuses ﬁnancing. To see
this, simply let both safe and risky borrowers refuse ﬁnancing at some node
with probability ε>0, and let ε → 0. Consistency of the above belief can
then be readily veriﬁed using Bayes’ Rule.
Given property iii., we have the following result, which will be used in
the proof to verify property i. in each region:
Lemma 3. When property iii. of Proposition 1 holds, as long as vs(p) and
vr(p) are weakly increasing then it is never optimal for an entrepreneur to
refuse ﬁnancing.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst a safe entrepreneur with credit score p.
Let C0 6= ∅ denote the set of contracts oﬀered, either on or oﬀ-the-
equilibrium path, and let r0 be the lowest rate in this set. Recall that
r0 ∈ [0,R] and pS(p,C0) describes lenders’ beliefs when the project is ﬁ-
nanced and the agent succeeds. From the second part of property iii., these
beliefs are such that pS(p,C0) >p .
So if the entrepreneur accepts r0 his expected discounted utility will
be R − r0 + βvs(pS(p,C0)). Conversely, if he deviates and instead refuses
ﬁnancing, his posterior is unchanged and so his expected discounted util-
ity will be βvs(p) from property iii. By the weak monotonicity of vs(·),
vs(pS(p,C0)) ≥ βvs(p) because pS(p,C0) >pand so, since r0 ≤ R, accepting
ﬁnancing must be (weakly) better.
The same argument applies to risky entrepreneurs.
We now verify property i., as well as the characterization of the equilib-
rium strategies in the various regions.
a. We show ﬁrst that when c
πh−πl ≥
(R−1)(1−βq)
1−β(πl+(1−πl)q) an MPE exists where,




To show that such strategies constitute an MPE in this case, we need
to demonstrate that (a-i) low eﬀort is incentive compatible for p ≥
pNF; (a-ii) that rzp(p,0) ≤ R for p ≥ pNF, i.e., that the contract is
admissible; and (a-iii) that there are no proﬁtable deviations for any
player.
a-i. Given the above strategies and beliefs, from (1) we get:
vr(p)=πl(R − rzp(p,0))+ (πl +( 1− πl)q)βvr(pS(p)). (6)
35By analogy with (5) above, for low eﬀort to be incentive compat-
ible we need to show that:
c
πh − πl
≥ R − r(p,0)+ β(1− q)vr(pS(p)), (7)
since from lemma 1 we necessarily have vr(pF(p)) = vr(0) = 0.
Since rzp(p,0) >r zp(1,0) = 1 for all p<1,
vr(p) <
πl(R − 1)
1 − β(πl +( 1− πl)q)
for all p<1, where the term on the right-hand side is the present
discounted utility of a risky entrepreneur who is ﬁnanced in every
period (until there is a failure which is not forgotten) at r =1 .
So for any p ∈ (pNF,1), we have







where the last inequality follows from the condition on c that
deﬁnes this case. This then veriﬁes (7).
a-ii. Note that rzp(p,0) ≤ R if and only if 1
p+(1−p)πl ≤ R, or equiva-
lently p ≥ pNF.
a-iii. Finally, we show that there can be no proﬁtable deviation from
this equilibrium.
First consider possible deviations by a borrower. We have shown
above thatat the contractr(p) the borrowernever wantstoswitch
from low to high eﬀort; also from observation 2 it follows that
borrowers would never choose a rate above r(p) when r(p) is also
oﬀered. So it only remains to consider a deviation consisting of
refusing an oﬀer of ﬁnancing.
Since r(p) ≡ rzp(p,0)isstrictlydecreasing and pS(p)is increasing,
it is immediate from (6) that the discounted expected utilityvr(p)
is weakly increasing in p in this case. The same argument also
applies to the safe agents’ expected discounted utility vs(p). On
the basis of Lemma 3, this implies that refusing ﬁnancing is never
proﬁtable for any borrower, which establishes property i.
Next consider a deviation by a lender. Since r(p)=rzp(p,0),
lenders always break even when they oﬀer ﬁnancing at r(p), and
36so they would not be able to increase their proﬁts by refusing to
oﬀer ﬁnancing when p ≥ pNF.
Consider then the alternative deviation consisting in the oﬀer of a
diﬀerent contract, with interest rate r0. Without loss of generality
we can restrict attention to deviations in which r0 <r (p), if
r(p) 6= ∅ (since otherwise entrepreneurs would not accept the
new oﬀer) and r0 > 1 (since otherwise the deviation would not be
proﬁtable for the lender).
Let the new set of contracts (which includes the deviation r0)b e
C0. Observe that by property iii., pS(p,C0) < 1 whenever p<1.
But then by the same argument as in a-i. above we can show that
since r0 > 1 the optimal eﬀort choice for risky entrepreneurs is to
exert loweﬀort, i.e., e(p,C0) = 0. When p ≥ pNF, since r0 <r (p)=
rzp(p,0), this makes the deviation unproﬁtable. Alternatively
when p<p NF, since r(p)=∅, for the deviation to be proﬁtable
under low eﬀort we would need r0 >r zp(p,0); however, when p<
pNF this implies r0 >R , i.e., that the contract is not admissible.






1−β(πl+(1−πl)q), an MPE exists characterized by 0 <p l ≤
pm ≤ ph < 1 such that: for p ≥ pl entrepreneurs are always ﬁnanced,
er(p) = 1 for p ≥ ph, er(p) ∈ (0,1) and is (strictly) increasing in p for
p ∈ [pm,p h), er(p) = 0 for p ∈ [pl,p m) and r(p)=rzp(p,er(p)).
We begin by characterizing the values of (b-i) ph, (b-ii) pm and (b-
iii) pl, showing that the eﬀort choices speciﬁed above for the risky
entrepreneurs is optimal. We then show (b-iv) that there are no prof-
itable deviations.
b-i. We ﬁrst determine the lower bound ph on the high eﬀort region.
Let ˜ pS(p,e) ≡
p
p+(1−p)[e(πh+(1−πh)q)+(1−e)(πl+(1−πl)q)]; this is the
posterior belief, following a success, that an entrepreneur is risky,
when the prior belief is p ∈ (0,1)and the eﬀortundertaken if risky
is e. That is, ˜ pS(p,e) is calculated via Bayes’ Rule as in property
iii. of the Proposition, but assuming that the risky agents’ eﬀort
is e. Also, let ˜ vr(p,1) denote the discounted expected utility for a
risky entrepreneur with credit score p when he is ﬁnanced in every
period until experiencing a failure that is not forgotten, he exerts
high eﬀort (e = 1), beliefs are updated according to ˜ pS(p,1) and
the interest rate is rzp(p0,1) for all p0 ≥ p. Then ˜ vr(p,1) satisﬁes
37the following equation:
˜ vr(p,1) = πh(R−rzp(p,1))−c+β(πh +(1−πh)q)˜ vr(˜ pS(p,1),1).
(8)
Note that while ˜ vr(p,1) and ˜ pS(p,e) are well deﬁned for all p ∈
(0,1), they coincide with the equilibrium values vr(p) and pS(p)
only for, respectively, p ≥ ph and e = er(p).




= R − rzp(ph,1)+ β(1 − q)˜ vr(˜ pS(ph,1),1) (9)
Observe that, since ˜ pS(p,1)is strictlyincreasing in p, and rzp(p,1)
is strictly decreasing, ˜ vr(p,1) is strictly increasing in p. Thus the
term on the right-hand side of (9) is increasing in p, and so (9)
has at most one solution.
We now show thata solutionph ∈ (0,1)to (9)alwaysexists. Since
˜ pS(p,1)and rzp(p,1)are both continuous for allp ∈ (0,1), ˜ vr(p,1)
is also continuous. As p → 1−,r zp(p,1) → 1 and ˜ pS(p,1) → 1,
and so ˜ vr(p,1) →
πh(R−1)−c
1−β(πh+(1−πh)q). Thus as p → 1−, we have
R−rzp(p,1)+β(1−q)˜ vr(˜ pS(p,1),1)→ R−1+β(1−q)
πh(R − 1)− c
1− β(πh +( 1− πh)q)
.
For the values of c in the region under consideration it is easy to
verify24 that R− 1+β(1− q)
πh(R−1)−c
1−β(πh+(1−πh)q) > c
πh−πl, and so as
p → 1−, we have




Conversely, as p → 0+ it is immediatetosee that(since ˜ pS(p,1) →
0 and rzp(p,1) → 1/πh),
R−rzp(p,1)+β(1−q)˜ vr(˜ pS(p,1),1)→ R−1/πh+β(1−q)
πh(R− 1/πh) − c
1− β(πh + q(1 − πh))
.










1−β(πl+(1πl)q), contradicting the lower bound on c that
deﬁnes case b.
38It is also not diﬃcult25 to show that under the condition on c
deﬁning case b.,
R − 1/πh + β(1 − q)
πh(R− 1/πh) − c





and so as p → 0+,




Thus by the continuity and monotonicity of ˜ vr(·,1), there must
be a unique solution ph ∈ (0,1) to (9). It is then immediate to
see, given the monotonicity of the term on the right-hand side of
(9), that for all p ≥ ph the incentive compatibility constraint for
high eﬀort (5) is satisﬁed.
b-ii. Next, we ﬁnd pm, the lower bound of the region where risky
entrepreneurs mix over high and low eﬀort, and establish the
properties of the equilibrium in this mixing region.
For mixing to be an equilibrium strategy at p, risky entrepreneurs
must be indiﬀerent between high and low eﬀort, i.e.,




for some e ∈ [0,1]. Now, let
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1) denote the preimage





deﬁne pm to be the lowest value of p ≥
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1) for which
a solution of (10) can be found for some e. Observe that by the
construction of ph, e = 1 is a solution to (10) when p = ph, and
so pm ≤ ph.
Now, for any p ≥
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1) we have ˜ pS(p,e) ≥ ph for all e
(since ˜ pS(p,e) is increasing in p and decreasing in e27). Thus





πh−πl. Then multiplying both sides of this inequality





contradicting the lower bound on c that deﬁnes this case.
26That is, the posterior belief of lenders, after observing a success, is equal to ph when
the prior belief was
￿
˜ p
S￿−1(ph,1) and the entrepreneur exerts high eﬀort if risky.
27This property can be easily veriﬁed from the expression of ˜ p
S(p,e) and can be under-
stood as follows: for any given p, the lower the probability e that the risky entrepreneurs
exert high eﬀort, the stronger is success a signal that the entrepreneur is a safe type.
39for any p ≥
￿
˜ pS￿−1 (ph,1), using our results from b-i., we have
vr(˜ pS(p,e)) = ˜ vr(˜ pS(p,e),1) for any e. By the continuity of
˜ vr(p,1) and rzp(p,e) it follows that the minimum value pm must
exist.
We can also show that pm >
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1), which will imply
that there is only a single period of mixing along the equilib-





≤ ˜ pS(ph,1) for any e.28 That is, no mat-
ter what eﬀort level risky entrepreneurs exert when lenders’ prior
belief is
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1), the posterior belief of lenders following
a success will be lower than when their prior belief is ph (in
which case entrepreneurs exert high eﬀort). Therefore, since
rzp(
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1),e) >r zp(ph,1) for any e and ˜ vr(p,1) is strictly












<R − rzp(ph,1)+ β(1− q)˜ vr(˜ pS(ph,1),1) =
c
πh − πl









). We conclude therefore that (10) has
no solution for e at
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1) and so we must have pm >
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1).
To conclude this part, it remains to establish that for all p ∈
[pm,p h] we can indeed ﬁnd a value of e satisfying (10), and more-
over that such value is strictly increasing with respect to p.
Suppose a solution to (10) with respect to e exists for some p ∈
[pm,p h]; since we can always take p = pm, this is always possible.
28Even without assumption 3, it would still be true that we have only a single period
of mixing along the equilibrium path, although the proof would be longer. Hence the
characterization would remain essentially unchanged. To see this, suppose it were not the
case and that we mixed both at p and its successor p
S(p). Since, as shown below in the text,
e(p) <e (p
S(p)), we have r(p) >r (p
S(p)), so for mixing to be incentive compatible, i.e.,
for equation (10) to hold both at p and p




















As we discuss below in footnote 30, assumption 3 is only strictly necessary in order to
be able to associate an equilibrium response consistent with Bayes’ Rule to any deviation.
40Let e(p) denote this solution (if there is more than one solution,
we pick the highest one):
c
πh − πl
= R − rzp(p,e(p))+ β(1 − q)vr(˜ pS(p,e(p))).
To prove the claim it suﬃces to show that for all p0 ∈ (p,ph)a
solution e(p0) of (10) also exists, and e(p0) >e (p).
Having established above that pm >
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1), since p ≥ pm
we have ˜ pS(p,e(p)) >p h and, for all p0 >p ,˜ pS(p0,e 0) >p h
whatever e0 is. Hence vr(˜ pS(p,e(p))) = ˜ vr(˜ pS(p,e(p)),1) and
vr(˜ pS(p0,e 0)) = ˜ vr(˜ pS(p0,e 0),1) for all e0. Since, as we showed,
˜ vr(·,1), as well as ˜ pS(·,e), are strictly increasing while rzp(·,e)i s
strictly decreasing (whatever e is), when p0 >pwe must have
c
πh − πl
<R− rzp(p0,e(p))+ β(1 − q)vr(˜ pS(p0,e(p))).
By the same properties, since p0 <p h we also have
c
πh − πl
>R− rzp(p0,1)+ β(1 − q)vr(˜ pS(p0,1)).
Hence, by the continuity of ˜ vr(·,1) there must be a solution e0 ∈
(e(p),1) to (10) at p0.
b-iii. We still have to determine pl, the lower bound on the ﬁnancing
region.
If pm ≥ pNF, set pl = pNF. By construction, rzp(p,0) ≤ R for
all p ≥ pNF; hence the contract rzp(p,er(p)), with er(p) = 0 for
p ∈ [pl,p m), er(p)=e(p) for p ∈ [pm,p h) and er(p)=1f o rp ≥ ph
is admissible for all p ≥ pNF.
Alternatively, if pm <p NF set pl to be the lowest value of p ≥ pm
such that the contract rzp(p,e(p)) is admissible (i.e., not greater
than R). Note that since rzp(p,e) is decreasing in e, we have
rzp(p,e(p)) ≤ rzp(p,0) for all p ∈ [pm,p NF], so this will imply
that pl ≤ pNF. In this case we also redeﬁne pm, with some abuse
of notation, to be equal to pl; following this redeﬁnition the low
eﬀort region [pl,p m) is then empty in this case.
Observe that in either case we have pl > 0. Furthermore, pl ≤
pNF, which implies that rzp(p,0) >Rfor p<p l. Furthermore,
pl ≤ pm, with pm as deﬁned in the preceding paragraphs.
41It remains thus to show that er(p) = 0 for p ∈ [pl,p m), i.e., that
low eﬀort is optimal in this region. We prove this in what follows,
together with the property that vr(p) and vs(p) are (weakly) in-
creasing for all p, which will also be used in part c-iv. of the
proof.
Solving the recursive expression (1)for vr(pS(p)) and substituting
into the diﬀerent expressions of the IC constraint for the three
regions of values of p, we obtain:29
vr(p) ≥
c(πl + q/(1 − q))
πh − πl
− (R − r)
q
1 − q
, if er(p) = 1; (11)
vr(p) ≤
c(πl + q/(1 − q))
πh − πl
− (R − r)
q
1 − q
, if er(p) = 0; (12)
vr(p)=
c(πl + q/(1 − q))
πh − πl
− (R − r)
q
1 − q
, if (10) holds (mixing).(13)
As established in b-i. above, when p ≥ ph we have er(p)=1 ,
in which case vr(p)=˜ vr(p,1), which we have shown is strictly
increasing. From (13) we also ﬁnd that vr(p) is constant for all
p ∈ [pm,p h] and hence, using (11), that it is weakly increasing for
all p ≥ pm.
To prove that er(p) = 0 for p ∈ [pl,p m) it suﬃces to consider the
case pl = pNF (when pl <p NF, we showed above that pl = pm).






. We will show
that the contract rzp(p,0), together with lenders’ beliefs in case
of success pS(p)=˜ pS(p,0),satisfy the IC constraint for low eﬀort.
Suppose this were not true, i.e.,




We will prove this leads to a contradiction. Note that for p in
the above interval p ≥
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1), hence ˜ pS(p,1) ≥ ph and
29When e
r(p) = 1 then (1) reduces to v
r(p)=πh(R − r(p)) − c + β(πh +( 1−
πh)q)v
r(p










πh−πl −(R−r(p)). Substituting for v
r(p





πh−πl − (R − r(p)), or (v




πh−πl − (R − r(p))
￿
(πh +( 1− πh)q). Simplifying, we get (11). The other expres-
sions are similarly obtained.
42vr(˜ pS(p,1)) = ˜ vr(˜ pS(p,1),1). Also note that p<p h, and so we
have ˜ pS(p,1) < ˜ pS(ph,1). Thus from the monotonicity of rzp(·,1)
and ˜ vr(·,1), we have
R − rzp(p,1)+ β(1− q)vr(˜ pS(p,1)) = R− rzp(p,1)+ β(1− q)˜ vr(˜ pS(p,1),1)
<R− rzp(ph,1)+ β(1 − q)˜ vr(˜ pS(ph,1),1) = c
πh−πl,
where the latter equality follows from the construction of ph.
Since ˜ pS(p,e) ≥ ˜ pS(p,1)for alle, so thatwe alsohave vr(˜ pS(p,e)) =
˜ vr(˜ pS(p,e),1),and ˜ vr(·,1)is continuous, the twoinequalitiesabove
imply that there must be a solution ˜ e to (10) at p, which contra-














By the argument in a. this also implies that vr(p) is strictly in-






and, using (11) - (13)





˜ pS￿−1(ph,1) we are done. Otherwise, we extend the result




˜ pS￿−1(ph,1)]. We will now demonstrate that (i)






and (ii) vr(p)i s










. To show (i), ﬁrst
note that since p<˜ pS−1
<p m, we must have pS(p)=˜ pS(p,0),
since lenders update via Bayes’ Rule and the equilibrium pre-
scribes low eﬀort (er(p) = 0) in this region. So
R−r(p)+β(1−q)vr(pS(p)) = R−rzp(p,0)+β(1−q)vr(˜ pS(p,0)).
In addition, since p<˜ pS−1
=
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1), by assumption 3
we must also have pS(p)=˜ pS(p,0) ≤ ˜ pS(ph,1) = pS(ph). Thus
vr(pS(p)) ≤ vr(pS(ph)), since vr(·) is increasing above ˜ pS−1
,a s
shown in the previous paragraph, and pS(p) ≥ ˜ pS−1
. Then using
the fact that r(p)=rzp(p,0) >r zp(p,1) >r zp(ph,1) = r(ph),
since rzp(·,·) is strictly decreasing, yields:




43with the latter equality following from the construction of ph.
Thus er(p) = 0, i.e., low eﬀort is IC at p. The same argument as





Now, if pl ≥
￿
˜ pS￿−1(˜ pS−1













and continue doing so until we reach pl.
Finally, to show that vs(p) is increasing, simply note that er(p)
is (weakly) increasing, and so r(p)=rzp(p,er(p)) is decreasing.
The result then follows from the deﬁnition of vs(p) in (2).
b-iv. Finally, we show that there are no proﬁtable deviations.
First consider the possibility of deviations by entrepreneurs, in
particular, the rejection of an oﬀer of ﬁnancing (as argued in
observation 2 this is the only deviation we need to consider). We
showed in part b-iii. above that vr(p) and vs(p) are (weakly)
increasing, so we can use lemma 3 to verify property i., i.e., that
it is never optimal for entrepreneurs to refuse ﬁnancing.
Next consider deviations by lenders. By the same argument as in
a-iii., refusing to ﬁnance an agent when p ≥ pl is not proﬁtable
for lenders. So when p ≥ pl it suﬃces to consider deviations
consisting in the oﬀer of a contract r0 <r (p) ≡ rzp(p,e(p)). By
contrast, when p<p l and there is no ﬁnancing in equilibrium,
the deviations consist of the oﬀer of a contract r0 ≤ R. Without
loss of generality we can also restrict our attention to the region
p<p h, since there can be no proﬁtable deviations when the
contract oﬀered in equilibrium supports high eﬀort (as in that
case r(p)=rzp(p,1) ≤ rzp(p,e) for all e).
In the statement of the Proposition we did not describe the risky
entrepreneurs’ eﬀort strategy er(p,r0) oﬀ the equilibrium path.
We do so here and show that er(p,r0) renders any possible devi-
ation r0 described in the previous paragraph unproﬁtable.









then er(p,e0) = 0 isan optimaleﬀortchoice of entrepreneurs when
they are oﬀered the rate r0 and lenders’ belief is that they exert
low eﬀort. If in addition p ≥ pl then r0 <r (p) ≤ rzp(p,0) and so
44the deviation is unproﬁtable. If p<p l, from c-iii. above we know
that rzp(p,0) >R , while the admissibilityof the contract requires
r0 ≤ R, so that r0 <r zp(p,0), i.e., the deviation is unproﬁtable in
this case as well.
Alternatively, suppose the reverse inequality to (14) holds. Then
since ˜ pS(p,e) is decreasing with respect to e and vr(·) is weakly
increasing, we either have30
R − r0 + β(1 − q)vr(˜ pS(p,e0)) ≥
c
πh − πl





for some e0 ∈ (0,1). (16)
so that the optimal eﬀort choice of risky entrepreneurs when of-
fered rate r0 is er(p,r0)=e0. Suppose r0 >r zp(p,e0); we will
prove in what follows that this implies a contradiction, thus es-
tablishing that r0 ≤ rzp(p,e0), i.e., that again the deviation to r0
is unproﬁtable.
When e0 =1 ,r0 >r zp(p,e0)=rzp(p,1) together with (15) imply
R − rzp(p,1) + β(1 − q)vr(˜ pS(p,1)) ≥ c
πh−πl. But since, as we
argued, vr(·) is increasing and rzp(·,1) strictly decreasing, this
would imply that R − rzp(ph,1)+ β(1−q)vr(˜ pS(ph,1)) > c
πh−πl,
contradicting the construction of ph in (9).
So consider instead e0 < 1. Then from r0 >r zp(p,e0) and equation
(16) we get








, so thatvr(˜ pS(p,1)) = ˜ vr(˜ pS(p,1),1)
and, from the deﬁnition of ph,




30By assumption 3, when p ≥
￿
˜ p
S￿−1(ph,1), we have v
r(˜ p




r(·) is continuous in ˜ e.
This is the only point in the proof where assumption 3 proves strictly necessary. Without
this assumption we could still prove the existence of an MPE, but the oﬀ-equilibrium path
beliefs would not necessarily be consistent everywhere with Bayes’ Rule and hence we
would not be able to claim that our equilibrium is also a sequential MPE.
45Since, as we argued, vr(˜ pS(p,e)) = ˜ vr(˜ pS(p,e),1) for any e,b y
the continuity of ˜ vr(p,1) it follows that there must be a solution
˜ e ∈ (e0,1) to (10). If p<p m the existence of such a solution
contradicts the construction of pm as the minimal value of p for
which a solution e(p) to (10) with rzp(p,e(p)) ≤ R exists in the
region p ∈ [
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1),p h], since rzp(p,˜ e) <r zp(p,e0) <r 0 <
r(p). Alternatively, consider p ≥ pm.I f˜ e>e (p) this contradicts
the construction of e(p) as the highest solution of (10) at p;i f˜ e ≤
e(p), this implies e0 <e (p), and thus r0 >r zp(p,e0) >r zp(p,e(p)),
another contradiction.





so that the deviation r0 will not be proﬁtable given the risky en-
trepreneurs’ optimal response er(p,r0)=e0.







restrict attention to deviations r0 >r zp(p,1); this is without loss
of generality, since if this were not the case the deviation could
never be proﬁtable, regardless of the risky entrepreneurs’ eﬀort
choice. We can show that in this case e0 = 0 is an equilibrium
response to r0 for the risky borrowers. To see this, note that since
r0 >r zp(p,1) and p<
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1), by assumption 3 it must be
that ˜ pS(p,0) ≤ ˜ pS(ph,1), and so vr(˜ pS(p,0)) ≤ vr(˜ pS(ph,1)) by
the monotonicity of vr(·) (established in c-iii. above). Using this
property and the fact that r0 >r zp(p,1) and rzp(p,1) >r zp(ph,1)
(by the monotonicity of rzp(·,1)), yields
R−r0+β(1−q)vr(˜ pS(p,0)) <R−rzp(p,1)+β(1−q)vr(˜ pS(p,0))




with the latter equality following from the deﬁnition of ph. This
establishes that e0 = 0 is indeed the risky entrepreneurs’ optimal
eﬀort choice when oﬀered r0.
We now argue that this renders the deviation unproﬁtable. First,
if p ≥ pl in equilibrium there is ﬁnancing and so the oﬀer of
r0 will only be accepted if r0 <r (p). But r(p)=rzp(p,0) in
this region, which means that the deviation will be unproﬁtable.
Alternatively, if p ∈ (0,p l), then when r0 is admissible (r0 ≤ R)w e
necessarily have r0 <r zp(p,0) since, as shown above, pl ≤ pNF,
which again makes the deviation unproﬁtable.




an MPE exists where, for all p>0 entrepreneurs are always ﬁnanced,
er(p)=1 ,r(p)=rzp(p,1) and pS(p)=
p
p+(1−p)(πh+(1−πh)q).
As above, to show that such strategiesconstitute an MPE for the above
values of c, we have to show that (c-i) risky entrepreneurs indeed prefer
to exert high rather than low eﬀort for all p>0 and (c-ii) there are
no proﬁtable deviations for any player. Note that by assumption 1
rzp(p,1) ≤ R for all p>0, so r(p)=rzp(p,1) is always admissible.
c-i. To show that high eﬀort is IC for all p>0, given the above
strategies, we need to show that
c
πh − πl
≤ R − r(p)+β(1− q)vr(pS(p)) (17)
for any p>0.
We ﬁrst argue that, for any p>0, a lower bound for vr(p) is given
by
πh(R−1/πh)−c
1−β(πh+q(1−πh)), which is the present discounted utility for a
risky entrepreneur ﬁnanced in every period (until a failure that is
not forgotten) at r =1 /πh and exerting high eﬀort. This follows
immediately from the fact that vr(p) is the present discounted
utility under the same circumstances except that the interest rate
is r(p)=rzp(p,1) < 1/πh for all p>0.
Thus since pS(p) > 0 for all p>0, we have
R−r(p)+β(1−q)vr(pS(p)) >R −1/πh+β(1−q)
πh(R − 1/πh) − c
1− β(πh +( 1− πh)q)
.
So to verify (17) it suﬃces to show that
R − 1/πh + β(1 − q)
πh(R− 1/πh) − c





But this followsimmediatelyfrom the argument givenin the proof
of b-i. above (see footnote 25, noting that region c. encompasses
precisely those values of c below the lower bound deﬁning region
b.).
c-ii. Now we show that there can be no proﬁtable deviations.
First, note that lenders cannot proﬁtably deviate. To see this,
simply observe that, given property i., for any r0 <r (p)=
rzp(p,1) a lender would make negative proﬁts, regardless of the
47risky entrepreneurs’ eﬀort choices, and hence r0 cannot be a prof-
itable deviation.
Next consider possible deviations by a borrower. In light of ob-
servation 2 we can limit our attention to deviations in which an
entrepreneur refuses ﬁnancing. Since high eﬀort is exerted for all
p>0, r(p) is strictly decreasing in p and so from (1) and (2) it
is easy to see that vr(p) and vs(p) are (strictly) increasing in p.
Thus from lemma 3 above, property i. must hold in this case as
well, i.e., refusing ﬁnancing must be unproﬁtable.￿
D Eﬃciency of Equilibrium
For simplicity we restrict attention to the case q = 0 (no forgetting); the
argument for general values of q is exactly the same. We begin by show-
ing that, as constructed in Proposition 1, our equilibrium maximizes er(p),
the eﬀort exerted by the risky entrepreneurs for any p. This will play an
important role in the proof.
Lemma 4. The equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 maximizes the
risky entrepreneurs’ eﬀort er(p) and utility vr(p) across all symmetric se-
quential MPE.
Proof. We focus on the ﬁrst statement — that concerning the eﬀort level
er(p); the result on vr(p) will follow as a consequence. Suppose that this is
not the case and that there exists some other equilibrium that implements
higher eﬀort at some p0. Let er(p),p S(p), and vr(p) denote the eﬀort, updat-
ing function, and risky-entrepreneur utility, respectively, for the equilibrium
of Proposition 1, and let er(p),pS(p),vr(p) denote the same for this other
equilibrium.
First note that it is immediate that we cannot have p0 ≥ ph. Moreover,
since the equilibrium of Proposition 1 gives all of the surplus to the borrow-
ers, it must also be the case that vr(p) must also be maximal for all p ≥ ph,
i.e. vr(p) ≥ ¯ vr(p) for all p ≥ ph. Also recall that vr(p) was shown above to
be weakly increasing. We now proceed by induction.
Having established that vr(p) is maximal for all p ≥ p∗ (where we begin
the induction with p∗ = ph), we consider p∗∗ ≡
￿
˜ pS￿−1(ph,1), the pre-image
of p∗ under high eﬀort. We ﬁrst show that we also cannot have p0 ∈ [p∗∗,p ∗).
Were this not the case, and we had ¯ er(p0) >e r(p0) for some p0, then in
order to satisfy incentive compatibility the continuation utility in the other
48equilibrium would need to be higher, i.e. ¯ vS(¯ pS(p)) >v r(pS(p)).31 But if
¯ er(p) >e r(p) then we necessarily have ¯ pS(p) <p S(p), and so from the
monotonicity of vr(·), we have vr(¯ pS(p)) ≤ vr(pS(p)). But since ¯ pS(p) >
pS(p) ≥ p∗, we must have ¯ vS ≤ vr(pS(p)), as vr(p) has been established to
be maximal for p ≥ p∗, a contradiction.
Thus we must have er(p) ≥ ¯ er(p), and hence vr(p) ≥ ¯ vr(p) for all p ≥ p∗∗.
We then set p∗ = p∗∗ and continue the induction, thereby establishing the
desired result for arbitrary p.
The following corollary is also immediate, since for lenders to break even
when p<p l would require a higher level of eﬀort than our equilibrium,
which we have shown is impossible.
Corollary 2. No MPE equilibrium can implement ﬁnancing when p<p l.
We now turn to demonstrating that our equilibrium is the most eﬃcient
MPE. From corollary 2, we can restrict attention to p0 ≥ pl, without loss of
generality.
As mentioned above, given an ex-ante probability that an entrepreneur
is the safe type of p0, then welfare is given by the expected total surplus
accruing from the agents’ projects. We can deﬁne this sequentially. Let pn
denote the posterior probability that an agent who has not failed thus far is
safe in period n. Recall that we have shown that in any MPE, risky agents
who fail must be excluded thereafter. So deﬁne bn to be the measure of risky
agents who have not failed through period n; note that b0 =1− p0, and,
more generally, bn = p0(1/pn − 1). Also let en = er(pn) denote the risky
entrepreneurs’ equilibrium eﬀort choice in period n.
Since the equilibrium constructed in Proposition 1 implements ﬁnancing
for all p ≥ p0, the surplus generated in period n is given by:
Wn = p0(R − 1) + bn[en(πhR − 1 − c)+(1− en)(πlR − 1);
where we have made use of the fact that the safe agents never fail and that
there is ﬁnancing in all subsequent periods. Observe that Wn ≥ 0 for all n,
since otherwise lenders could not break even in this period; this is a general
property of all MPE.
31More precisely, if we are in the mixing region (in which the risky agents are indiﬀerent
between high and low eﬀort) then the other equilibrium could implement higher eﬀort




S(p)). But recall that we chose eﬀort in the mixing region to
be maximal in constructing the equilibrium in Proposition 1.






Now consider some other equilibrium that implements a higher level of
ex-ante surplus at p0. Let W,Wn,pn,bn,en denote the analogous quantities
for this other equilibrium (where Wn = 0 if there is no ﬁnancing in period
n). We will show that it is not possible for this other equilibrium to generate
a higher ex-ante surplus.
First suppose that p0 <p m, where pm is the mixing cutoﬀ in our equi-
librium (recall that if there is no mixing in our equilibrium then pm ≡ ph
and then this case is empty). Consider those values of n such that pn <p m.
Now, from lemma 4, any equilibrium will either implement low eﬀort for
period n, or else it cannot oﬀer ﬁnancing in period n. First note that this
implies that we can restrict attention to equilibria which oﬀer ﬁnancing for
all such n. Otherwise, by the Markov Property, any equilibrium which does
not oﬀer ﬁnancing in period n could not oﬀer ﬁnancing in any subsequent
period, thus implying that Wn∗ = 0 for all n∗ ≥ n, and hence a lower total
discounted surplus. Thus all equilibria we consider implement low eﬀort
when ¯ pn <p m, implying that pn = pn for these values of n.
Next, consider n such that pn ∈ [pm,p h), the mixing region.32 From
above we also have pn = pn for this n. As above, we can restrict attention
to equilibria oﬀering ﬁnancing in this period, without loss of generality. So
by Proposition 4, we must have en ≥ ¯ en, and hence Wn ≥ Wn.
Note, however, this impliesthat pn+1 ≤ pn+1 (see footnote27), and hence
bn+1 ≥ ¯ bn+1. That is, there will be (weakly) more risky agents remaining in
the pool in the equilibrium of Proposition 1.
The rest of the argument is now immediate. Since the equilibrium of
Proposition 1 implements high eﬀort from the risky entrepreneurs in period
n + 1 and all subsequent periods, and since we have just shown that there
are more risky entrepreneurs in period n+1, this must clearly dominate any
other equilibrium.
If p0 ∈ [pm,p h)o rp0 ≥ ph then the argument is identical, omitting the
irrelevant cases.￿
32Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that this can be the case for at most one period.
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1−β(πl+(1−πl)q) is decreasing in
q, the condition deﬁning region a.
in Proposition 1 is satisﬁed for all q. At the MPE there is ﬁnancing only
when p0 ≥ pNF and risky entrepreneurs never exert high eﬀort, regardless of
the value of q.
Hence if p0 ≥ pNF, the total surplus generated in equilibrium by the loans
to risky entrepreneurs is B
1−(πl+(1−πl)q)β, , which is strictly decreasing in q
since B<0. Thus q = 0 is optimal. If on the other hand p0<pNF, such
surplus is zero for all q, and so q = 0 is also (weakly) optimal.
Consider now case 2. Again notice that
(R−1/πh)(1−βq)




1−βπl , the condition deﬁning region c. of Proposition 1









￿ > 0. Hence
at the MPE there is always ﬁnancing whatever p0 is, and for all q ∈ [0,q∗],
and risky entrepreneurs always exert high eﬀort. That is, for q ∈ [0,q∗], the
total surplus generated in equilibrium by the loans to risky entrepreneurs is
G
1− (πh +( 1− πh)q)β
.
Now this is increasing in q since G>0. Thus any q ∈ (0,q∗] dominates
q = 0 and the optimal value will be q(p0) ≥ q∗.33￿
F Proposition 4 – Optimal Forgetting (region b.)
For case 1 (p0 >p h(0)) the proof is an immediate corollary of the second
case of Proposition 3.
Consider then case 2. Since p0 ≥ pNF, the agents will always be ﬁnanced
at the initial date, irrespective of q. Thus, by the argument given above,
it suﬃces to show that we can increase the surplus generated by the risky
entrepreneurs’ projects. Letting Wr(q,p0) denote the surplus from the risky
agents’ projects, when the forgetting policy is q and the prior probability
of being safe is p0, we will show that under the conditions stated in the
Proposition, we can ﬁnd some ¯ q>0 such that Wr(¯ q,p 0) > Wr(0,p 0).
We proceed as follows. For any q>0 we ﬁrst ﬁnd a threshold ˜ ph(q)
for ph(q), relative to ph(0), such that if ph(q) < ˜ ph(q) then this surplus is
33The optimal value of q could be higher than q
∗, which would push us out of region c.,
into region b.
51higher at q than at 0. We then show that the parameter restrictions stated
in the Proposition ensure the existence of ¯ q>0 such that ph(¯ q) ≤ ˜ ph(q).
Let n(q,p0) denote the number of successes (or forgotten failures), start-
ing from the prior p0, until the risky entrepreneurs ﬁrst exert high eﬀort,
when the forgetting policy is q. Then the following upper and lower bounds












B(1 − ((πl +( 1− πl)q)β)
n(q,p0))
1 − (πl +( 1− πl)q)β
+
G(πl +( 1− πl)q)β)
n(q,p0)
1 − (πh +( 1− πh)q)β
. (19)








B(1 − ((πl +( 1− πl)q)β)n(q,p0))
1 − (πl +( 1− πl)q)β
+
G(πl +( 1− πl)q)β)n(q,p0)
1 − (πh +( 1− πh)q)β
.


















(1 − πl)(1− q)
+
(πl +( 1− πl)q)n(q,p0)
(1 − q)(1− πl)(1 − πh)
￿






since 1 − (πl +( 1− πl)q)=( 1− πl)(1 − q) and 1 − (πh +( 1− πh)q)=
(1 − πh)(1− q), or, equivalently, to
π
n(0,p0)−1
l (1 − q) −
B
G(1 − πh)q
(1 − πl) − B
G(1 − πh)
< (πl +( 1− πl)q)n(q,p0) (20)
34When there is no mixing in equilibrium (i.e. pm(q)=ph(q)), W
r is simply equal to
the discounted expect surplus generated by consecutive successes of the project (the ﬁrst
n(q,p0) of which with low eﬀort, the remainder with high eﬀort):
W
r(q,p0)=
B(1 − ((πl +( 1− πl)q)β)
n(q,p0))
1 − (πl +( 1− πl)q)β
+
G(πl +( 1− πl)q)β)
n(q,p0)
1 − (πh +( 1− πh)q)β
.
With mixing in equilibrium, the exact expression of W
r depends on the equilibrium level
of eﬀort exerted in the mixing region. However, since there can be at most only a single
period of mixing in equilibrium, an upper and lower bound for such utility is given by (18)
and (19), independent of the mixing probability.
52It will be useful to rewrite (20) in terms of a condition on ph(q) and
ph(0). To this end, notice that ph(q) and n(q,p0) are related by the following
expression: n(q,p0) is the smallest integer for which35
p0








































Simplifying, we obtain the following suﬃcient condition for q to implement
a welfare improvement as β → 1:
ph(q) < ˜ ph(q) ≡
p0(πl +( 1− πl)q)

















We now show that the condition on B/G stated in the Proposition en-
sures that we can ﬁnd ¯ q>0 such that ph(¯ q) satisﬁes (22) and so we can
achieve a welfare improvement. We begin by providing a convenient upper
bound for the level of ph(q).
For intermediate values of c, lying in the region where type b. equilibria
obtain when q =0 ,ph(0) belongs to (0,1) and satisﬁes equation (9) above.
It is then easy to see from the deﬁnition of this region in Proposition 1 that,
when β is suﬃciently close to 1, c will remain in the same region for any




= R − rzp(ph(q),1)+ β(1 − q)˜ vr(˜ pS(ph(q),1),1;q), (23)
35When there is no mixing in equilibrium, i.e., pm(q)=ph(q), the validity of this
expression follows immediately from the deﬁnition of ph(q) and n(q,po). The fact that it
also holds with mixing can be seen by noticing that in such case the probability of success
is greater or equal than when low eﬀort is exerted, and so the posterior is ˜ p
S(p,e(p)) ≤
˜ p
S(p,0). Hence n(q,p0) will be greater or equal than the term satisfying (21). But n(q,p0)
cannot be strictly greater, as this would imply that we mix for more than a single period,
which we have shown (in the proof of Proposition 1) cannot happen.




1−πl , both independent of q.
53where, similarly to (9), ˜ vr(p,1;q) denotes the discounted expected utility of
a risky entrepreneur with credit score p, when he exerts high eﬀort for all
p0 >pand the contracts oﬀered are rzp(p,1), highlighting the dependence
of the utility on the forgetting policy q. From (23) and (9) we obtain then:
−rzp(ph(0),1)+β˜ vr(˜ pS(ph(0),1),1;0)= −rzp(ph(q),1)+β(1−q)˜ vr(˜ pS(ph(q),1),1;q).
(24)
By a similar argument to that in the proof of parts a. and c. of Proposi-
tion 1, a (strict) upper bound for ˜ vr(˜ pS
h(ph(0),1),1;0) is given by the utility
of being ﬁnanced in every period at the constant rate r = 1 until a failure
occurs, while exerting high eﬀort, i.e., by
πh(R−1)−c
1−βπh . Conversely, when the
forgetting policy is q, a (strict) lower bound for ˜ vr(˜ pS(ph(q),1),1;q) is given
by
πh(R−rzp(ph(q),1))−c
1−β(πh+(1−πh)q) , that is, the utility of a risky agent when ﬁnanced
at the constant rate rzp(ph(q),1) until he experiences a failure that is not





πh(R − rzp(ph(q),1))− c
1 − β(πh +( 1− πh)q)
.
When β → 1, the above inequality becomes
−rzp(ph(0),1)+
πh(R − 1) − c
1 − πh
> −rzp(ph(q),1)+




rzp(ph(q),1) > (1 − πh)rzp(ph(0),1)+ πh.




> (1 − πh)
1
ph(0)+ (1 − ph(0))πh
+ πh,
or
ph(0) + (1 − ph(0))πh > (1 − πh)[ph(q)+( 1− ph(q))πh]+πh[ph(q)+( 1− ph(q))πh][ph(0) + (1 − ph(0))πh]
=[ ph(q)+( 1− ph(q))πh][1− πh(1 − πh)(1 − ph(0)]],
(25)
which is in turn equivalent to:
ph(0)(1− πh)+πh > [ph(q)(1− πh)+πh][1− πh(1 − πh)(1− ph(0)]],
i.e.,
ph(0)(1− πh)+πh
[1 − πh(1− πh)(1− ph(0)]]
> [ph(q)(1− πh)+πh].
54The above inequality implies that when β is close to 1 the following upper
bound on the level of ph(q) must hold, for all q:




[1 − πh(1− πh)(1− ph(0)]]
. (26)





G(1−πh). Hence, under the condition on B/Gstated in the Propo-




[1− πh(1− πh)(1− ph(0)]]
<p 0
(1 − πl) − B
G(1 − πh)
p0(1− πl) − B
G(1− πh)
,
or equivalently that, for q close to 1 we have ¯ ph < ˜ ph(q).
Thus on the basis of the previous discussion we can conclude that there
exists ¯ q yielding a welfare improvement over q =0 .￿
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